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INTRODUCTION 
The question of justice is by far the most important 
problem in taxation. In discussing this question, one is led 
to criticise double taxation as being essentially unjust. Just 
as it is unfair to tax those having no fact1fty to pay, it is 
also unjust to exempt those having this quality. It is also 
held as unjust not to tax persons according to their different 
degrees of faculty, Sometimes it happens that two persons 
having the same ability are taxed differently, and an ex· 
ample is to be found in the case of double taxation where 
persons are taxed twice over, though others having the same 
ability are taxed but once. However, it is easy to see that 
double taxation does not necessarily mean an over burden 
on the part of taxpayers. For double taxation makes the 
imposition of taxes in accordance with men's faculty possible. 
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taxation. That which is regarded as double taxation by 
some is often excluded from the category of double taxation 
by others. This difficulty gives rise to the following ques-
tions: first, how far should we enter this field?; secondly, 
what significance should be assigned to it?; and thirdly, 
what kind of double taxation should be regarded as unjusti-
fiable ? I wish first to elucidate the nature of double taxa-
tion with the hope of answering these questions. Next I 
shall study the international aspects of double taxation. It 
is this particular form of double taxtion which is most 
difficult of solution, most unjustifiable, and, at the same time, 
most important. The problem of international double taxa-
tion arises because of the fact that different states adopt 
different principles of taxation. I shall first point out the 
different principles of taxation and then propose the basic 
measures for avoiding international double taxation. I shall 
next study the solution of the following questions: taxes on 
international commerce and industry, taxing of persons hav-
ing residences in several countries in the state of residence, 
and taxes on documentary securities in which several coun-
tries are interested. Double taxation is chiefly found in the 
case of direct taxes such as the income tax, taxes on pro-
ducts, and the property tax. When, therefore, the question 
of double taxation is discussed, these taxes are usually 
mentioned to the exclusion of otlulrtaxes. However, double 
taxation arises also in the case of other taxes, especially the 
transaction and consumption taxes. I herein wish to point 
out the general conceptions of double taxation, to attempt 
to solve some of the more difficult problems of international 
double taxation, and to dwell on the transaction and con-
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PART I 
DOUBLE TAXATION IN GENERAL 
1. TECHNICAL TERMS IN DOUBLE TAXATION 
The term" double taxation" (Doppelbesteuerung; double 
imposition) is generally used to indicate the taxing of the 
same object twice over, but it is often used in referring to 
triple or quadruple taxation, all of which belong to the same 
category. For example, property, products, or income from 
products may be taxed either by the authority of the loca· 
tion of property or products, and by that of the country of 
the taxpayer's political allegiance, and also by that of his 
residence. In the case of the inheritance tax, it is levied by 
the authority of either the inheritor or the legator. This 
alone is enough to show how complicated double taxation is 
and that the word "double taxation" hardly expresses the 
real nature of this form of taxation. 
There are several terms regarded as synonimous with 
double taxation. Conrad uses "doppelte Erfassung" and 
Stein uses "Deppelte Steuer" in the same sense as "Dop-
pelbesteuerung. " 
There are also terms, which, while usee- in different 
sense from the term double taxation, usually are employed 
to convey a partial meaning of the term or in its broad 
sense. Lotz, for instance, uses the term "Doppelbelastung" 
to designate double taxation by the same authority, and 
prefers to employ "Doppelbesteuerung" to indicate double 
taxation by two equal competing authorities. Pereles, on the 
other hand, uses "Doppelbelastung" to designate the . im· 
position of the same tax twice over on the "subject of the 
tax" (taxpayer); and, in consequence, it is narrower than 
Lotz's meaning, as it excludes the imposition of two different 
taxes (for example the income tax and tax on products.) 
The best example of a term which is used in the broad 
meaning of double taxatiOn is given by Eheberg. He uses 
___ ._. _____ • __ • ______ • ____ ._. ___________ 0 ______ • _______ ~ 
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the term "wiederholte Belastung od. Besteuerung" which 
refers to double taxation on the same source of tax. 
Lastly, there are terms which although resemble double 
taxation are totally different from it. Double taxation means 
taxing the same thing twice over, and it is not the same as 
the multiple tax which is opposed to the single tax. The 
single tax and multiple tax are the names of the tax systems 
of a country or body; under the former, the tax system is 
based on a single tax, while in the latter case, the system 
is based on two or more different taxes. Of course there 
is some connection between double taxation and multiple 
tax, but the connection is not essential. Multiple' tax may 
or may not result in double taxation. Moreover, it is pos-
sible for two competing states to adopt a system of single 
tax on the same object. Thus, the question of double taxa-
tion can also exist in a country with a single tax. 
2. THE MEANING AND KINDS OF 
DOUBLE TAXATION 
(1). I shall first set forth my own views regarding the 
nature of double taxation and then those -of other writers. 
(A). The meaning of the term: double taxation is 
taxing the whole or part of a tax·object twice or more 
times. 
(B). Kinds of double taxation: 
i. Classification depends on whether the tax'subject 
is the identical person or different persons. 
(i). When taxes are imposed upon the same ob-
ject of the same person twice over, as follow: 
(a). When the tax is imposed upon the whole 
of the object. 
(b), When the tax is imposed upon a part of 
the object. 
(ii). When different persons are taxed on the 
same object. 
An example- of the case given in (a) of (i) can be found 
--~---------------------------.-----~-.--
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in the local government's additional charges on national taxes 
such as the income or business tax. That of the case given 
in (b) of (i) is found within a state's practice in which real 
products or property is taxed in addition to the income tax; 
another example is the practice among nations in which a 
person is taxed by both the country of his residence and 
by the country where a part of his property is located. 
The income tax is often imposed upon a person on his land, 
house, or business by the country of his residence, while a 
tax on products is also imposed upon him by the country 
where his property is located or where he carries on his 
business. The property and income taxes are also imposed 
by these two different competing authorities. Examples of 
the case (ii) are found first in the imposition of the income 
tax upon corporations. and individuals on the same dividend; 
secondly, in the imposition of the property tax upon a person 
on his credit although the amount taxed is not deducted 
from the property of the debtor; thirdly, in the imposition 
of a capital interest tax upon the products of the creditor 
while no consideration in the imposition of a land tax is 
taken of the fact that the land is held as a mortgage; fourthly, 
in the imposition of the business tax upon a corporation 
while a capital interest tax is also imposed upon the mem-
bers of that corporation for the dividend which they receive 
from the corporation; and lastly, in the imposition of taxes 
upon the land, buildings, and other thjugs which are utilised 
in business, although the business tax does not take the 
fact into consideration. It may be said that in the case 
of (b) of (i) in which the income tax and the property tax 
or tax on products are imposed simultaneously, (excluding 
the double taxation of the income and special income tax), 
it may he said that these taxes are imposed on different 
objects; and that consequently, the case cannot be taken as 
an example of double taxation. But it must be admitted 
that there is so great similarity between income and products 
that they can be regarded practically as the same thing. 
~ l Th< -= ~d '""""' '"" h< ,1w "8mdol ~ u._ 
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thing; in this case, property being a manifestation of income. 
Again the argument may be advanced that in the case of 
(ii) the corporation and its members are not taxed on the 
same object, but on different objects. It may be asserted 
that, when the corporation and its members pay the income 
tax and tax on products, they are doing so as different in-
dependent persons; that their incomes are also different; 
and that, for this reason, this case should not be included 
in the category of double taxation. Again, some believe 
that the question of nonconsideration of debt and of non-
deduction of the building expenses, both in the income tax 
and tax on products, should be regarded as a matter of the 
measurement of the faculty of the debtor and of the business 
man who pay the taxes, instead of regarding it as an issue 
of double taxation. Thus, it may be contended that the 
case of (ii) at least should be excluded from the category 
of double taxation, even though the case (i) may be included. 
However, both are usually included in double taxation, and 
I have followed the usual custom. 
ii. Classification depends 1,Ipon the nature of au-
thorities. 
(i). When taxed by the same authority. 
(ii). When taxed by different authorities. 
(a). When taxed by authorities of different 
ranks within a body politic. 
(b). When taxed by competing authorities. 
1. When taxed by different localities in a 
state. 
2. When taxed by different states. 
Examples of (i) are double taxation of the income tax 
and tax on products (or the special income tax) in the na-· 
tional tax, to which sometimes is added a second tax on 
product, also that of the additional charge on income tax 
and the household tax in the local tax. The case of (a) 
of (ii) is exemplified by the local additional charges to 
taxes like the income, land, and business taxes:""'""""Whether 
such additional chirges are to be regarded as double taxes 
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will depend upon what principle of taxation is adopted by 
a particular community. If additional charges are justified 
and imposed with some restriction and supervision over 
them, their existence is inevitable. Thus some exclude these 
taxes from the category of double taxation. The case in (b) 
of (ii) is taxation by the authority of the country of the tax-
payer's residence and by the authority of the country where 
the taxed property is located. This case is often a hotly 
disputed issue between local government bodies themselves. 
iii. Classification according to ju.stifiableness. 
(i). Justifiable double taxation. 
(a). When double taxation arises out of the 
imposition of the income tax side by side with a 
tax on real product, or a special income tax on real 
products, or the property tax, within the same 
jurisdiction, the purpose of the whole system being 
to tax heavily on income from property. 
(b). Double taxation by different authorities. 
1. Supposing one' of the several competing 
states should impose the personal and real taxes, 
the former at the places of residence and the 
latter at the location of the property, it is evident 
that the system is a double taxation even though 
the same system is adopted by the other states 
in competition. This kind of double taxation 
should be regarded as justifiable as that of the 
income tax with tax on products in a country. 
2. Additional charges imposed by authorities 
of different ranks are also )ustifiable as has al-
ready been pointed out. 
(ii). Unjustifiable double taxation. 
(a). By the same authority. 
1. The same property of the same persot\ is 
often taxed twice over. Thus in localities the 
additional charge for one's income is imposed 
upon him side by side with the household tax 
which is also based upon his income. Although 
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the two taxes are not exactly the same, they are 
so alike that it is only sheer duplication to impose 
them both. It is much better to select one to 
the exclusion of the other so as to simplify the 
tax system. The matter would be quite different, 
if these taxes were as different from each other 
as the personal and real taxes are. At any rate, 
the elimination of one of these two personal taxes 
will certainly result in economy in tax collection. 
The imposition of the excess profit tax side by 
side with a tax on dividend cannot be regarded 
as a double taxation, inasmuch as in the former 
tax the income itself is not taken as its basis, but ~ . 
it is rather a transaction tax based upon the 
special condition of the income arising from the 
change of value. The exeess profit tax may be 
regarded as a tax on a particular favorable mani· 
festation of income. But even supposing that. its 
imposition side by side with the tax on divided 
is to be regarded as a duoble taxation, it is a 
justifiable one as in the case of heavy imposition 
on an income from property. 
2. Taxing different persons for the possession 
of the same object separately as is shown by the 
following examples is also unjustifiable: taxing a 
person on his oredit while no corresponding deduc-
tion is made from the property of the debtor; 
taxing the landlord for the land which is being 
held as a mortgage at the same time imposing a 
capital interest tax upon the creditor; reaching 
buildings through the land and house taxes but 
failing to deduct the building expenses fro!:!Y the 
business tax. These cases are apparently unjusti-
fiable double taxes. This evil may be avoided by 
exempting them from taxation, on the ground of 
disability, 
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taxation is that which results from competition be-
tween the authorities of the country of taxpayers' 
residence and those of the country where the pro-
perties are located_ This happens either between 
states or between different localities within a state_ 
This kind of double taxation in the income tax, the 
property tax and taxes on products is a great crime 
in public finance_ But the evil is not limited to 
these taxes; it is also seen in the transaction tax 
and the consumption tax_ 
(iii). Debatable double taxtion. The double tax-
ation of corporations and their. members. _ I have 
already pointed out why this form of double taxation 
is open for discussion. 
The main standard by which the justifiableness of 
double taxation is to be judged is its practical consequence 
-whether a particular form of double taxation results in 
a heavier burden upon some taxable object compared with 
others belonging to the same category. Only the double 
taxation of the household tax and the income tax in the 
local tax must be judged from other standpoint. 
(2). The views of other writers. . 
(A). Those who define double taxation as taxing the 
same source of taxation twice over. 
i. By the source of taxation is meant income and 
property, income in particular in normal times. In fact, 
income is regarded as the source of all taxes. In many 
countries the income tax alone is held as insufficient in 
order to reach this source, and taxes such as the pro-
perty, transaction, consumption taxes' as well as the 
taxes on products, are regarded as absolutely necessary. 
But, if taxing the same source of taxation twice or 
more times is regarded as double taxation, nearly all 
taxes by a state or local government bodies must be 
regarded as such. This evidently embraces too wide a 
field, although such a view is not impossible. A .lW'Jre 
limited definition of -double taxation is desirable. This 










is why I have chosen the phrase "tax·object" instead 
of "the source of taxation." 
ii. This view, however, is not without some ad· 
vantages. It may be said that this view will result in 
elucidating the truth that all taxes in the end is de· 
pendent upon income, and further leads one to consider 
whether various taxes he has to pay is equitable as far 
as his income is concerned. No such practical conse· 
quence will come from the other view which regards 
double taxation merely as taxing a tax-object twice or 
more times. The former view thus touches the vital 
issue in taxation, namely, the "question of justice. From 
the viewpoint I am upholding, it is difficult to regard 
taxes such as the transaction and ccnsumption taxes 
as double taxes, not to mention those taxes on income, 
property and products, while from the viewpoint under 
discussion it is comparatively easy to show that they 
are double taxes and that therefore are unjust ones. 
It goes without saying that such a critical survey of 
the question of justice in taxation is by all means. de· 
sirable. Of course the injustice in the transaction and 
consumption taxes can also be detected from the view· 
point of tax·object. When the transaction tax is levied 
on some object once, while other objects in the same 
category are taxed twice or more times, the injustice 
of double taxation is only too apparent. It also happens 
frequently that the consumption tax is levied upon an 
object once when it is produced for personal consump· 
tion, and then for a second time when it has become 
material for some finer production, thereby sesulting in 
double taxation. But such double taxation can be part· 
ly explained from the viewpoint of the source of taJ{a· 
tion. This view may be considered as double taxation 
in the broad sense. But that does not imply that all 
cases of double taxation viewed from the standpoint of 
tax·object are included. The case of double taxation in 
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tax-subjects, for instance, will be left outside its cate-
gory_ 
(B)_ Those who define double taxation as taxing the 
same person or the same thing twice over_ 
i. This definition will be found to be at once 
superfluous and meaningless_ Every tax has two aspects: 
tax-subject and tax-object each of which cannot be 
treated separately_ When a person is taxed twice over, 
something is taxed twice over; and when a thing is 
taxed twice over, some one pays his tax twice over_ 
ii. This definition, however, contains some measure 
of truth which I shan point out next_ . 
(i). It is convenient, the advocate of this definition 
may contend, to divide an taxes into two categories: 
the personal and real taxes. The former regards man 
as the central factor of taxation, and embodies the 
income tax and property taxes in some form; while 
the latter treats obiects as the central factor and 
embraces all other taxes. It may be further asserted 
that taxing a person twice over is the imposition of 
a double personal tax, while taxing an object twice, 
over is the imposition of a double real tax. But a 
serious difficulty will arise over the possibility of the 
case that a man may be called upon to pay a tax 
upon person as well as a tax upon obiects. It is 
apparent that the case is too important to be excluded 
from the field of double taxation, though such a 
difficulty is regarded as impossible of elimination. 
Furthermore, a certain personal tax such.....as an in-
come tax is a double tax on the same thing, simply 
for double imposition of capital interest as part of the 
whole income. Such a tax as this can be regarded 
neither as a double tax upon the same person nor as 
a double tax upon the same thing. Therein lies one 
defect of this dual definition of double taxation. 
(ii). Taxing different persons on the same tax-
object may be considered as a double taxation on the 
t 
----"'--- - - -- - - -- -- ---- - -
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same thing, while taxing the same person on the 
same thing may be regarded as double taxation on 
the same person. But the idea of the same thing is 
the central issue of double taxation, and even the 
case of taxing the same person twice over is not a 
mere taxing the same person, but taxing the same 
thing twice over. I am confident, therefore, that my 
own definition is more fitting than this view. 
(iii). The view is advanced that double taxation 
by competing authorities is to be considered as the 
double taxation of the same person, while that by the 
same authority is to be considered as the double taxa-
tion of the same thing. This- view, however, is 
untenable for the same reason_ 
• I 
(C)- Those who define double taxation as taxaing 
two different tax-subjects on the same thing under the 
same authority, and taxing the same person twice over on 
the same thing under competing authorities. This view 
is too narrow to suit actual facts in taxation. Although 
the definition embraces the most important phase of double 
taxation, it excludes the possibility of double taxation of 
the same tax-subject twice over under the same authority_ 
(D)_ Those who define double taxation as over-taxa-
tion of the same thing by competing authorities. Although 
such over-taxation is the principal problem of double taxa-
tion, it is by any means the only one; and therefore any 
definition which does not take into consideration the other 
phases must of necessity be inadequate. 
(E). Those who define double taxation as the im-
position of the same or similar tax twice over upon the 
same persons on the same source of taxation under the 
same authority. In this definition the impropriety of the 
term '.' source of taxation" is somewhat remedied by the 
word .. similar taxes," but it excludes the cases of double 
taxation on different persons and by different authorities. \ 
(F). Those who define double taxation as the imposi-
tion of the same' tax twice over on the same income. 
o. ___ oo. _____________ ~ 
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This definition is also too narrow inasmuch as it excludes 
the important cases of international double taxation as 
well as those of income and property. 
(G). Those who accept the so·called popular defini-
tion. This is nearest to my own definition, but it lacks 
the scientific precision of terms. 
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF 
DOUBLE TAXATION 
(1). The centre of the problem. Double taxation be-
comes an issue chiefly because of equity in tax burden. 
However, it is also an important problem from the stand-
point of both economic policy and government revenue. 
(2). Why the problem has added importance in modern 
times. The problem is very old; it is as oldest as the 
oldest tax. But its importance has increased in modern 
times because of the following causes. 
(A). The development of taxes. 
i. Complexity of taxation system. The fact that 
taxation system grew from simple to complex has much 
to do with the recent growth in the importance of 
double taxation. In old times taxation system was 
simple and was made up of a few taxes; in consequence 
there was no serious problem of double taxtion. It is 
difficult to imagine double taxation, for instance, where 
only the land tax existed. But with the increase in the 
number of taxes whose compensatory action is required 
there naturally appeared the phenomenon of double taxa-
tion. 
ii. Increse in the demand for taxes. A great in-
crease in the demand for taxes has been a cause of / 
double taxation. If the demand of taxes is small, there 
would be no need of taxing objects twice over, but a 
great demand necessarily involves such a phenomenon. 
(B). Economic development. 
i. Complexity of personal relations. An increase 
14 M.KAMBE 
in the complexity of relations between men due to the 
economic expansion of society is another cause for the 
rapid increase in the number of double taxes. When 
one carried on its economy independent of others there 
could be but little double taxation; but after communica· 
tion has been developed and trade relations increased, 
one's tax comes in conflict with that of others, thereby 
giving rise to duplicate or triple taxation. 
ii. Complexity of geographical relations. With an 
increase in the freedom of travelling, residence, enter· 
prise, and investment, the opportunity for double taxa· 
tion becomes greater. During the years before and 
after the World War, an increase was seen in the 
amount of foreign investment and in the number of 
foreign tourists, and this was accompanied by an in· 
crease in double taxation. Even when the countries 
concerned adopt the same principle of taxation for the 
purpose of solving this perplexed problem, it is exceed· 
ingly hard to get the desired result, especially when it 
comes to double taxation upon business enterprises. 
(3). Double taxation viewd from equity in distribution. 
(A). The importance of equity in taxation. The 
problem of double taxation has been actively challenging 
public attention because the question of equity in taxa· 
tion has been subjected to a more searching scrutiny than 
formerly. Although the question of justice in taxation 
was the subject of public discussion in old times, it did 
not occupy the important place it commands in modern 
times. And, as this question is more and more regarded 
as important, that of double taxation has been receiving 
an increasing attention throughout the civilized world. 
(B). Progress of general ideas. 
i. Change of attitude towards the authority. In 
old . times the authority was regarded as absolute and 
inviolable, but now the actions of government officials 
are placed under the searching criticism of citizens. 
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been freely discussed by citizens and the cases of double 
taxes began to be exposed before the public gaze. 
ii. Change of attitude towards foreign residents. 
In former times foreigners were regarded more or less 
as enemies, and the imposition of a heavy tax upon 
them was not regarded as unjust. But to·day this 
attitude had been greatly modified and in some cases 
foreign residents are treated the same as the natives reo 
garding the matters of taxation. Discrimination against 
foreigners are now regarded as obnoxious, and this 
changed situation has given rise to a cry against double 
taxation. 
(4). Key to the solution of the problem. The key is 
to be found in the improvrnent of the tax systems of in-
dividual countries and in the definite and specific conclusion 
of international agreements. 
PART II 
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION 
CHAPTER I 
DISCUSSION OVER PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
Of the various cases of double taxation that which is 
discussed frequently and the solution of which is most 
difficult is international double taxation. This phenomenon 
arises because of the fact that the different nations of the 
world adopt different principles of taxation, due mainly to 
their respective different conditions. I wish to take up herein 
those different principles with the hope of finding ways and 
means to avoid double taxation as far as possible. There 
are the following three main principles: personal principle 
(including those of political allegiance, temporary residence, 
and permanent residence), real principle (that of location of 
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property or resources), and principle of economic allegiance 
or economic interest, which is a sort of a combination of 
the first and second principles. I shall discuss them in the 
given order. 
(1). International taxation according to personal prin-
ciple. 
(i). General question. It may be said that since the 
duty to pay taxes belongs to persons, taxes should be 
levied upen them as such. On the other hand, it may 
also be said that since taxes are to be levied not on per-
sons as such but according to their ability to pay, any 
principle which does not take tax-objects into considera-
tion is defective. 
(ii). The principle of political allegiance. According 
to this principle, foreigners are not taxed by the authority 
of their residence, while the nationals of a state are taxed 
even when they are abroad. 
(Al. Its merits. 
i. This principle admirably fitted the condition 
of the old time when there was very little communica-
tion between nations whose nationals mostly resided 
within ilieir national boundaries. As iliere were but 
few foreigners in a country, they were exempted from 
taxation of the country where they resided; nor did. 
this exemption cause any embarrassment to the public 
finance of the country. 
ii. Aside from the question of the merits of this 
principle, it may be assumed that double taxation can 
be avoided if the nations should all adopt this prin-
ciple. 
iii. As long as a taxpayer retains his political 
allegiance toward the country of his domicile, he has 
natural affection for his home country and is conscious 
. of his duties one of which certainly is to pay taxes. 
Furthermore, it may be said that, as long as he 
remains to be a citizen of one country, the possibility 
of his receiying protection from that country is ever 
---- ----_.---------
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present; and that, as a consequence of this possibility, 
he should bear the tax burden of his home govern-
ment. 
(B). Its defects. 
i. This principle has the defect of impracticability. 
It is highly difficult to tax those who are abroad be-
cause the" rapid progress in international communica· 
tion in modern times has greatly increased the num-
ber of people living or investing in foreign coun-
tries. 
ii. Double taxation becomes inevitable when this 
principle is adopted by one country while other coun-
tries adopt other principles such as that of residence 
or of location of property. 
iii. The exemption of the taxes on foreign reo 
sidents which is one of the logical consequences of 
adopting this principle, will result in reducing the 
amount of the public revenue of the country. It is 
comparatively easy to enforce tax regulations llPon 
foreigners, and consequently their exemption must be 
regarded as doubly unwise from the standpoint of 
the public income of a country. Such an exemption 
will indeed have a serious consequence if made by a 
country" which is a debtor nation and which has to 
import capital from foreign countries. 
iv. As long as foreigners and foreign investments 
receive protection from the country where they are 
located, it is proper that they share in the tax burden 
of that country. Even when con!\idered from the 
viewpoint .of the principle of faculty, the exemption 
seems to have no logical basis. Moreover, in modern 
times the force of political aIlegiance has been con-
siderably weakened, and it has become more and 
more nominal. 
(iii). The principle of temporary residence. Accord· 
ing this principle, taxes are imposed upon persons who 
happen to be in a partic}llar place-town, city, or state. 
Ii 
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(A). Its merits. 
i. This principle may be regarded as a logical 
conclusion from the idea that taxes are a matter 
primarily of persons. 
ii. Taxation upon persons at their present reo 
sidences may be regarded as more practicable than 
other methods. 
(B). Its defects. 
i. The principle will result in an over burden. 
If a tourist happens to spend a day or two in a town 
or city at the time of tax collection, there is no good 
reason why he should be taxed for a term or year 
by that town or city. An economic relation may exist 
between him and the town or city as a result of his 
staying there a day or two, and in consequence he 
may become subject to taxation; but he should not 
be taxed for his whole capacity at his temporary 
residence. Only the simple consumption and transac· 
tion taxes should be imposed upon him. 
ii. If this principle is adopted in different loca· 
Iities, a traveller will be taxable in each locality as 
the time of tax collection may not be the same for 
all, and thus he may be taxed twice over for his 
whole faculty. 
iii. At the same time, it may also happen that a 
traveller is not taxed at all, as he may not chance to 
be at any of the places at the time of tax collection. 
Thus, it is possible according to the principle in 
question that the one who ought to be taxed are not 
taxed at all. 
iv. The practicability of this principle is only 
superficial, for it will be nearly impossible to impose 
those direct taxes requiring an extensive investigation 
upon persons moving from one place to another. 
(iv). The principle of permanent residence. Accord· 
ing to this .principle, men are taxed by the authority of 
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meant staying for a definite limit of time, such as a year, 
six months, or three months, etc. 
(A). Its merits. 
i. As long as man is regarded as the central 
factor of taxation, this principle has a far more de-
fensible theoretical basis than all other principles. It 
may be argued that residence is the basis of one's 
economic life, and that, for this reason, the one who 
has selected any place for his permanent residence 
ought to be taxed by the authority of that place. 
Morever, even foreign residents receive benefits from 
the place of their residence, and therefore ought to 
pay taxes to its authority. 
ii. As permanent residence is an easily discernible 
as well as permanent fact, taxation based upon this 
fact will be highly practicable. 
iii. If this principle is adopted by all countries 
and practiced consistently, international double taxation 
could be avoided. 
iv. Of course, the resource country will lose some 
of its revenue, as property is often owned by non· 
residents. However, economically such a loss may 
be made up by the inflow of foreign capital which 
will be stimulated by the exemption of taxes, thereby 
encouraging the economic development of the country. 
(B). Its defects. 
i. One difficulty of this principle is that it can-
not be applied on some taxes, taxes on products for 
example. It is also very difficult to reach incomes 
derived from outside sources. 
ii. When other countries adopt a principle other 
than the one under consideration, and tax, say, on 
the out-going income, a case of double taxation will 
follow. The only remedy in such circumstances is to 
coax the other countries to adopt the same principle 
of international taxation. 
iii. Although the income derived by the resident 
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of a country from outside sources represents part of 
his faculty, as long as the income was earned in a 
foreign country, the revenue, which the home govern-
ment derives by taxing the same income, may be 
regarded as a sort of an unjustifiable revenue on the 
part of the home government. On the other hand, it 
also be said that exempting the foreign residents' in-
come which is taken out of the country is an act of 
injustice in taxation, inasmuch as they receive numer-
ous benefits from the country where the income is 
derived. Viewed from the faculty theory, it may be 
said that the out-going income can be regarded as . 
representing a faculty in taxation and for this reason 
is taxable. 
iv. Usually foreign investors are absentees who 
are not desirable social elements in a country; and it 
may be said that they should not be exempted from 
taxation. On the other hand, those who make a 
luxurious living on their income derived from foreign 
soil can be regarded as highly desirable citizens from 
the business policy of the country in which they live; 
and taxing them on their foreign income in accor:dance 
with this principle may result in driving them out of 
the country. 
v. If this principle be adopted, it would be im-
possible to tax on the wealth which is· carried away 
to foreign countries; and this no doubt is undesirable 
from the standpoint of public revenue, especially when 
the conntry is a debtor nation. 
(2). International Taxation According to Principle of 
Location of Resource. 
(i). General question. According to this principle, 
taxes are levied by the authority of the locaton of the 
resource, without special regard to its owner. 
(ii). Its merits. 
(A). Double taxation, can be avoided if this principle 
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(B). It is highly practicable chiefly because it is 
easy to reach the object. 
(C). Theoretically speaking, the fact that an income 
is derived from a certain source or that a certain pro-
perty exists at a certain location, indicates that income 
or property is given protection by the government under 
whose jurisdiction it exists; for this reason justice 
demands that its owner pay taxes to that government. 
Furthermore, aside from the consideration of benefits, 
it may be said that the fact of ownership itself thrusts 
upon a foreigner a duty to pay taxes to the govern· 
ment under whose jurisdiction the property is given 
protection. 
(D). The principle is a desirable one from the 
standpoint of the social and economic necessity of 
discouraging absentees and, of the advisability of being 
lenient to the foreigners who live on the income derived 
in a foreign country. 
(E). As it is easy. to reach the tax·objects under 
this principle, the principle is also desirable from the 
standpoint of public revenue. 
(iii). Its defects. 
(A). Its practicability is doubtful because of the 
difficulty of taxing income from business. 
(B). When one country adopts this principle and 
other countries adopt other principles, such as the per· 
sonal principle, double taxation follows. 
(C). Under the operation of this principle those 
who derive their income from a foreign source are ex· 
empted from taxes, although they receive benefits from 
the country of their residence and have a faculty to pay 
taxes; this evidently is unjust. Of course this difficulty 
can be remedied to a certain extent by the imposition 
of the consumption and transaction taxes. The principle 
is usually criticised from the benefit theory, but it can 
also be explained by the faculty theory. It may be 
argued that as long as the resource is located within a 
'" 
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country its taxation will be based upon faculty, although 
one's faculty getting from foreign country may not be 
taken into consideration. But the consumption and 
transaction taxes may be regarded as a partial remedy 
for this non-consideration. This argument may be re-
futed by the fact that under the principle of the loca-
tion of the resource, the faculty theory cannot be carri-
ed out consistently inasmuch as such important elements 
as progression, consideration of personal circumstances, 
and the exemption of debtors are lacking. 
(D). The exemption of direct taxes upon the per-
sons deriving incomes from foreign sources will prove 
detrimental to the public revenue of the country, es-
pecially for a creditor nation. 
(E). Viewed from the economic standpoint, the 
taxing of imported capital may result in checking the 
inflow of foreign capital and the development of the 
natural resources of the country. A creditor nation also 
may experience some difficulty but only to a very limit-
ed degree inasmuch as it wiIl not need to invest its 
capital in a debtor country on disadvantageous terms. 
(3). International Taxation According to Principle of 
Economic Interest. . 
(i). General question. This principle is the medium 
between the personal principle and the real principle. It 
also embodies the principles of the location of the resource 
and of permanent residence (in some degree, temporary 
residence and politial allegiance) and harmonizes the oppos-
ing principles of personality and reality. Under this 
principle one's taxes are to be distributed among compet-
ing jurisdictions according to his economic interests under 
each authority. 
(A). The proportion of different elements. Tempo-
rary residents usually bear the burden of· the consump-
tion and transaction taxes; it is usually said to be tax-
ed heavier on resources (earning) and lighter on residence 
(consumption), and Schanz shows this 'comparative rela-
------~---
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tionship in figures, saying that the former should con· 
stitutes a three·fourths and the latter one·fourth, of the 
fiscal burden. Although his view is too dogmatic, the 
theory favouring heavier taxation on resources and lighter 
taxation on residence is based upon the idea that a per· 
son gets more benefits from the authority where he is 
engaged in business than from the authority under 
whose jurisdiction he resides. One should show gratitude 
for the authority under whose jurisdiction he secures 
some economic gains, and he should also be thankful 
towards the authority of the country where he spends his 
income; but the country on the other hand, should also 
be thankful to him for consuming his income. Further· 
more taxing on the resources is much more practicable 
than taxing on residence. There are two more reasons: 
taxing on resources is more sensible than that on reo 
sidence, and there is a historical fact that the real tax 
was developed much earlier than the personal tax. 
(BJ. The order of the elements. This is another 
view of the proportion of the different elements just 
referred to. Taxation on resources should precede that 
on residence, because exeptions precede the general law .. 
(iiJ. The principle in which direct taxes are levied 
at the location of resource and the consumption taxes at 
the place of residence. The conception of faculty in taxa· 
tion has two aspects, namely, production and consumtion. 
The former is taxed on income, products and property, 
while the latter through the consumption taxes both direct 
and indirect. In distributing taxes among the competing 
authorities, the state or states from which the earnings 
are derived should levy taxes on prod ucts, property, and 
income; while the consumption taxes should be taxed by 
the state or states where the earnings are spent. 
(AJ. Its merits. 
i. Both the state where the resource is located 
and the state where the taxpayer resides secure some 
revenue. 
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ii. Since both the location of the resource and 
the place of one's residence indicate the economic re-
lationship between the taxpayer and the authorities, 
it is theoretically justifiable to let the interested 
authorities to levy taxes. 
iii. Its execution is practicable. 
iv. Double taxation could be avoided if the 
principle should be adopted by all countries. 
(B). Its defects. 
i. If it is a state which taxes one at his residence, 
its share will be great enough, because the amount 
of consumption taxes which are national taxes is so 
great as to surpass the amount of the direct taxes; 
however, in the case of a local body, its share will be 
too small as a local body usually lacks the consump-
tion tax almost entirely. 
ii. Expenditure in the state where the consump-
tion taxes are levied connot be regarded as a satis-
factory basis for faculty in taxation. And, in the 
state where the direct taxes are levied, the principle 
of the location of the resource cannot be practiced 
consistently as such essential elements as progression, 
personal circumstances, and consideration for debts, 
are not sufficiently taken into consideration. 
iii. When this principle is adopted by the na-
tions of the world through an international agree-
ment, the creditor nations will be placed in a decided-
ly disadvantageous position. 
(iii). The principle which taxes on products, special 
income, and property at the location of the resource, while 
the general income, at the place of residence. 
(A). Its merits. 
i. The levying of the personal taxes at the place 
.of residence and the real taxes at the location of the 
resource conforms to the respective natures of the 
personal and real taxes. In the case of the income 
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in taxation, as progression, personal circumstances, 
consideration for debts, are included in their entirety. 
ii. This principle will allow the authorities of 
both states to secure a reasonable amount of revenue. 
iii. It has a high measure of practicability. 
iv. Double taxation could be avoided if all na-
tions should adopt this principle. 
(B). Its defects. 
i. The property tax is often levied personally. 
It is not proper to levy this tax at the location of 
the property. On the other hand, if it is levied at 
the place of residence, the share of the state of re-
sidence would be too excessive. 
ii. Again, suppose a country has a system of 
direct taxation consisting mainly of the income tax 
(general), and its special income tax is either partly 
levied or is incomplete. That country's position would 
be too advantageous if it is the state of residence; 
but it would be too disadvantageous if. the country 
is the state where the taxable property is located; 
moreover, if that country is a debtor nation, its share 
of the tax would be too small; and if it is a creditor 
nation, its share would be too great. 
iii. Where the general income tax and the special 
income tax exist side by side, it is often hard to draw 
a line of demarkation between the two. This also 
accompanies the difficulty which arises from the division 
of taxes among different authorities according to the 
kinds of taxes. 
(iv). The principle under which the tax on products 
is levied by the state where the resource exists, while 
those on income and property are divided equally between 
the two authorities of location and residence. This princi-
ple evidently is unjust. According to this principle, a 
country which imposes a heavy tax on products in addi-
tion to the income tax, will get a share much larger than 




country levying the income as well as property taxes. 
The principle should be modified as follows: the countries 
having the taxes on income and products should adopt as 
standard one half of a sum of taxes on income and pro-
ducts, and this standard should be applied in taxing 
foreign residents' products and income from the foreign' 
sources. In adopting progression in the division of taxes 
between the two authorities, in the case of the income 
tax alone, only one half of the income of foreign sources 
should be added to that of domestic sources, while the 
rate of tax applicable to this sum should be the same 
rate which is applicable to an amount equal to the entire 
amount of the income from foreign sources and, the in-
come from domestic sources. In the case of the countries 
having the income tax as well as tax on products, if the 
ratio between the two taxes is 1-1, the entire amount of 
the income from foreign sources may be taxed;' if the 
ratio is 2-1, the three·fourths of the income from foreign 
sources should be taxed; if the ratio is 1-2, an amount 
equal to the total amount of the foreign income plus one 
haif of the same amount, should be taxed. The calcula-
tion may be difficult and may not be exact, but it. is 
necessary to secure equity in taxation as much as possibie. 
(A). Its merits. 
i. Under this system both countries can· derive 
the proper amount of revenue, as the general income 
tax is also divided between them. 
ii. Both countries are entitled to levy direct 
taxes. 
III. It has a high measure of practicability, and 
also simplicity when interested countries have a system 
of direct taxation consisting chiefly of the income and 
property taxes, (taxes on products being excluded). 
iv. Double taxation could be avoided if all na-
tions should adopt this principle. 
(B). Its defects. 
i. As long as there are nations having the in-
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come tax together with tax on products, instead of 
aU nations adopting the income tax system only, the 
principle under discussion will involve a serious 
difficulty, as tax on products must be levied by the 
state where the resource is located. 
ii. It may be suggested that an equal division of 
taxes into the state of residence and that of location 
is arbitrary, although such arbitrariness may be held 
justifiable to a certain extent. It may also be pointed 
out that the state of residence, which derives one half 
of the revenue from the income tax in addition to 
that of the consumption tax, is apparently receiving 
too great a share. However, this, may be also held, 
justifiable, if one takes the view that in taxation the 
relationship between a person and the jurisdiction 
under which he has residence is to be regarded as 
more important than the question as to where he 
derives his income. Modem nations attach more im· 
portance to the fact of residence than that of loca· 
tion, and tbeir direct taxation is more and more based 
upon the income tax, abandoning taxes on products 
as far as possible. An international agreement em-
bodying this tendency should be regarded as highly 
desirable. 
(v). The principle under which the direct tax com-
prising the resident's tax, the origin tax, and the com-
posite tax, and the resident's tax, is imposed upon the 
income from foreign sources; the origin tax, upon the 
out-going income; and the composite tax, upon the domestic 
income which stays in the country. This principle is 
formaUy a separate principle, but in its essential nature 
is not different from the fourth principle. The same thing 
could be said of the third principle, but for the fact that 
difference in the rates of the special and general taxes 
and confusion in distinguishing between these two sets of 
taxes, result in injustice in international taxation. 
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to be levied by the state of location in their entirety, 
while the state of residence is to make deductions. 
(A). The state of residence deducts from the tax 
of the residents who have already paid taxes to the 
state of locality an amount equal to that which was 
paid to the state of locality. According to this principle, 
if the amount of the tax one paid to the state of 
locality is greater than that which he has to pay to the 
state of residence, he will be called upon to pay no 
more; but when the case if reverse, he will have to 
pay an amount equal to the difference between the two 
payments. This may be effective to a certain degree in 
preventing double taxation, but involves a sacrifice on 
the part of the state of residence. It is certain that 
the state of residence will not consent to make such a 
sacrifice. It is a great injustice in the international 
distribution of tax burdens. 
(E). The principle under which the state of locality 
taxes in full while the state of residence imposes one 
half of what a person has to -pay under ordinary circum-
stances upon income from foreign sources. 
(C). The principle under which the state of loc~lity 
taxes in full, while the state of residence imposes a 
suitable rate of tax upon the amount of income from 
foreign sources minus the amount of tax levied by the 
foreign state. 
(D). The principle under which the state of locality 
taxes only on the immovables, while the state of re-
sidence deducts from the amount of taxes upon income 
from foreign immovables an amount equal to that which 
was paid in the state of locality. All of these principles 
are not essentially different in their fundamental con-' 
ception from the one given in (A), and have the same 
defects. 
(vii). The principle under which the state of residence 
1 
taxes the whole income in full, at the same time impos- I 
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income tax system but tax on products also faUs in this 
field. According to this principle, a state taxes on the 
out·going income but does not exempt the in-coming in-
come which is taxed under the principle of residence. 
This principle is evidently desirable from the standpoint 
of a country's public finance, but it will not prevent 
double taxation. 
(viii). The method which adopts the principle of loca-
tion of resource as regards the direct taxes on the specified 
income and the sources of income, and the principle of 
residence as regards other income and sources. 
(A). One practice falling under the above principle 
is that which adopts the principle of location of pro-
perty as regards land, houses, business, and other tangible 
property, and the principle of residence as regards in-
tangible property, its income and other incomes. Under 
this practice it is convenient to have the corporation 
securities taxed by the' state where the corporation is 
located and to have the mortgages on the immovables 
taxed by the state where the immovables are located. 
(a). Its merits. 
i. If this principle be adopted by all countries, 
double taxation could be avoided. 
ii. It has a measure of practicability. 
iii. Both the states of residence and location 
of property get a portion of the revenue, and for 
this reason the principle is desirable from the 
standpoint of public finance. 
iv. This principle may be justified from the 
nature of some tax-objects. Land, houses, and 
business should be taxed at their location as they 
have an inseparable connection with the place of 
their location, but the movables should be taxed by 
the authority of the residence of their possessors. 
(b). Its defects. 
i. The state of location of property will derive 
a share will be too great, while the share of the 
• 
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state of residence will be too small. Credit nations 
will be also placed in a disadvantageous position. 
ii. Theoretically speaking, it cannot be said 
that land, houses, business have economic relation-
ship with the state of location only, because they 
also have similar relationship with their owners and 
with the latter's income. 
(B). The practice in which the immovables, business 
and income from salaries and services are taxed by the 
state of location, while the movables and capital, by 
the state of residence. 
(C). The practice in which land, houses and busi-
ness are taxed by the state of locality while capital in-
terest, and incom from labour, by the state of residence. 
(D). The practice in which the immovables (in-
cluding mortgages on the immovables) are taxed by the 
state of locality and all others by the state of residence. 
All of these practices are the same as the practice (A). 
They cannot bring about any better or juster distribution 
in international locality and all others by the state of taxation.' 
(ix). The principle which combine the main features 
of the principle of economic interest with some of the 
principle of political allegiance. Crobaugh treats it 'as a 
separate principle, but it hardly is entitled to such a 
treatment. This principle is practiced by Germany, the 
United States and Japan. Its essential nature is given in 
Principle (vii). 
CHAPTER II 
SOME CASES OF DIFFICULTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
Section 1. Taxation on International Business 
Taxation on business is a matter full of difficulty. If 
the sphere of business be limited to a single Iocality or 
state, the difficiculty will not be so great; but with the 
, 
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rapid development in communications in modern times, busi-
ness has become more and more inter-state in nature, and 
its sphere has been greatly expanded, so that competition 
between different and often conflicting authorities has given 
rise to many a serious difficulty in taxation on business. 
If, as in the case of vessels, mutual exemption of taxes can 
be made, the matter will be very simple, but such an ex-
emption is possible only in the case of a few special objects 
such as vessels, and its general application in industry and 
commerce is wellnigh impossible. A modern nation is com-
pelled to adopt one of the principles which are the middle 
ground between the personal and real principles; it can 
adopt neither the personal nor the real principle in its pure 
form. When business is taxed in a single district or state 
(according to the principle of location of property), the matter 
is simple enough; but when it extends over many districts 
or states, great will be the task of finding a proper method 
of taxation and of a proper standard for the distribution of 
the taxes. Of numerous immovables, such things as land 
or houses cause no dispute as to their jurisdiction (although 
theoretically it is possible to consider of land or a house 
extending over several districts or states, but they will give 
rise to no special difficulty as they can be taxed separately 
by the several authorities). In the case of business, it is 
frequently carried on in many jurisdictions, and thus gives 
rise to the difficult question of how to avoid double taxation 
on business products or income. This question, so far, has 
not been given a definite solution. I am dealing herein in-
ternational double taxation but my argument will also apply 
to a similar phenomenon between different local jurisdictions 
, as well as between colonies and their mother land, 
1. DIFFICULTY IN TAXATION ON 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
(1). Circumstances of difficulty in taxing international 




location of property, the clearest cases are land and houses . 
Both land and houses cause no dispute as to which jurisdic-
tion they belong. True, there can be a dispute between 
the authorities of residence and location, but there can be 
no two locations for the property. A land may extend over 
two jurisdictions, but such a case ought to cause no serious 
controversy, as it is an easy task to divide the land between 
them. Some movable objects may give rise to some dispute. 
Nevertheless their external location can be definitely ascer-
tained. Its location can be, for convenience sake, fixed at 
its owner's residence. But business, although it is both ex-
ternal and fixed, is hard to locate. If business is comprised 
simply of such tangible things as land or a shop, there 
would be no dispute betweem competing jurisdictions, because 
it could then be taxed at its location. However, as a matter 
of fact, business often comprises of numerous shops, factories, 
offices, and other facilities all belonging to an industrial unit. 
Sometimes there are also branch offices or factories. If all 
of them are located in one jurisdiction there will be no 
occasion for a dispute; if they are located in different 
localities within a state, it is also comparatively easy to find 
a solution of the problem. If, on the other hand, they are 
scattered among different states, a serious problem will arise 
and double taxation will be inevitable. If the different 
branches and factories are managed independently of one an-
other and their accounts are separate, it will be comparative-
ly easy to meet the situation. But, if they are different 
stages of an industrial process, so that only the final stage 
formally derives a definite profit, the situation will be found 
baffling. It is-clear that the state in which are located those 
branches and factories which do now derive any profit as 
far as the book-keeping of the enterpriser is concerned.....:that 
state is justified in taxing them. On the other hand, it is 
difficult to apportion the entire income or products among 
the different branches and factories. Furthermore, those 
branches and factories which have independent management 
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dependent, inasmuch as they are parts of an industrial unit, 
and have many things in common. It is a very difficult 
task to find a standard by which the respective shares of 
those branches and factories of an industrial unit can be 
determined. 
(2). Different taxes involved. 
(A). The income tax.-This tax cannot escape the 
difficulty under consideration. It is greatly difficult to ap· 
portion the income of a business unit (whether a corpora· 
tion or businessman) among its different establishments 
which are scattered in many countries. The Japanese In· 
come tax Law now enforced imposes a personal tax upon 
any corporation or natural person (whether native or foreig- . 
ner) who has a domicile or who has a residence of one 
year or more in Japan on all incomes derived both there 
and abroad through its establishments or factories. This 
method is a very simple, but it has one serious defect in 
that reaching the taxable objects abroad is most difficult. 
If the foreign state from which the income is derived 
taxes on the same income, double taxation ensues. In 
attempting to avoid double taxation, it will be . much 
difficult to set aside this income from the entire amount 
of income. It must be supposed that the majority of the 
foreign business establishments here in Japan are the 
branch establishments or factories whose main offices are 
located in foreign countries. They will be taxed on what 
they earn in Japan, but it is difficult to separate this in-
come from the total amount of which the former is part. 
(B). Tax on products.-The business tax, which is one 
of taxes on products, will be imposed on the business 
done within a country only, because of the very nature of 
tax. This idea is adopted by our own business tax which 
excludes the business carried on outside of its jurisdiction. 
For this reason our country is compelled to face the same 
difficulty which is seen in case of the income tax, name-
ly, that of separating a part from the total amount of 
the income of a given enterprise. 
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2. HOW TO MEET DIFFICULTY IN INTER· 
NATIONAL BUSINESS TAXES 
(1). Method of distributing tax burden between the 
location of the main office and those of branch establish· 
ments. 
(A). Taxing the main office only.-While each busi· 
ness may be taxed by the state of location, the authority 
of the state where the main office is located can tax a 
business enterprise on its entire income, derived from its 
various branch establishments and factories, none of which 
may be taxed separately. This is not the taxing of the 
owner of an establishment in accordance with the prin' 
ciple of location of property, not that of residence. The 
residence of the owner of a business firm and the loca· 
tion of its main office are not always the same; for this 
reason the practice is not according to the principle of 
residence. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). This method is justifiable to some extent 
because of the importance of a main office. 
(ii). The method has simplicity as there .is no 
need of separate tax for each branch Establishment 
or factory .. 
(iii). Double taxation could be avoided if all 
nations should adopt this principle. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). It has one great defect of injustice in the 
distribution of tax revenue among the interested 
states, the state where the main office is located deriv· 
ing an unjustifiably great portion of the revenue. It 
must be seen that the states where the branches are 
located also assist the firm to derive profits by ex· 
tending them protection and conveniences of various 
sorts, it will be a great injustice not to allow those 
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Moreover, should this principle be adopted by all 
countries, firms will attempt to establish their main 
offices where the taxes are the lowest, and this will 
add to the injustice involved. 
(ii). The public revenue of the state where the 
branches are located will suffer. 
(iii). Taxing at the main office alone will result 
in failure in collecting the incomes derived by the 
branches, in actual practice. 
(B). Taxing the main office as well as the branches. 
-This method is exactly the opposite of the one we just 
considered. In order to execute this method justly among 
the nations of the world, it would be necessary to adopt 
a definite standard for the distribution of the tax revenue 
among the competing states. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). Under this method every interested state 
will derive some revenue. 
(ii). Since the state where a main office or a 
branch office is located has economic relationship with 
the business firm and spends money to protect it, 
it is just and proper that it should receive a portion of 
the tax revenue. This method fulfills this require' 
ment admirably. 
(iii). The. collection of taxes under this method 
will be comparatively exact as each state will supervise 
the taxation in its own jurisdiction. 
(iv). If this method is adopted by nations through 
an interstate agreement, double taxation could be 
largely avoided. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). This method can be said to disregard the 
importance of a main office as it treats a main office 
on the same levels with the branches. 
(ii). It is greatly difficult to find a suitable 
standard for the distribution of taxes when such a 
standard is looked upon from both justice in taxa· 
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tion and the practicability of reaching taxable objects. 
(C). Special taxes for the main office.-The main 
office as well as the branches are taxed, but the former 
is taxed specially. The state of the location of the main 
office should impose a portion of the regular tax on the 
entire business enterprise of a firm (one-fourth for instance) 
and then distribute the remainder among all (the main 
office and the branches) according to some definite stan-
dard. Or, first set aside a certain amount for the state 
of the location of the main office, and then distribute the 
whole amount among the states of the main office and of 
the branches; and, if the share of the state of the main 
office does not reach the amount reserved, the shares of 
the states of the branches should be reduced according to 
a certain ratio, in order to increase the former's share. 
(a)_ Its merits.-
(i). This is a middle ground between the first 
and second methods; and it is free from the over-
emphasis on the importance of the main office (as in 
the first method) and also from the disregard of this 
importance (as in the second method). It recognizes 
the importance of the main office, and at the same 
time allows the states of the branches to derive a 
proper amount of revenue. I believe this method to 
be the most equitable one. -
(ii). Every interested state can receive a portion 
of the tax revenue. 
(iii)_ It has some measure of practicability. It 
is free from the tendency seen in the first method, 
namely, the tendency to encourage taxpayers to 
remove head offices to the place where the tax burden 
is the lightest. 
(iv). If an interstate agreement can be establish-
ed, double taxation would be eliminated to some ex-
tent. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). Since the method is delicately complicated, 
I 
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some measure of difficulty is accompanied by its exe-
cution. 
(ii). Strictly speaking, it is highly doubtful wheth-
er the method will bring about justice. The fixing 
of the main office's portion and the standard of general 
distribution may not be equitable. However, the 
method seems to be better than any other. 
(2). Standard of distribution of tax revenue among 
different states where business establishments are located.-
While some differentiation is necessary between the tax re-
venue of the state of the main office and those of the states 
of the branches as above seen, some standard of distribu-
tion of tax revenue among states where business establish-
ments are located should be adopted; The following are 
some of the theories on this standard: 
(A). Taking income as basis.-The incomes of the 
various establishments are calculated and the share of 
each is measured according to the relative amount of 
income. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). This method will be equitable, if it can only 
be carried into practice. If the separate income of 
each location can be established, its share of tax re-
venue can be determined easily, a special share being 
reserved for the state of the head office. This is the 
most equitable method of international tax distribution. 
(ii). Every interested state will be enabled to 
derive a proper amount of revenue. 
(iii). Double taxation would be avoided if the 
method could be carried into practice. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). Of various earnings, business income is most 
difficult to' reach. Where an industry has various 
establishments in various places and each is regarded 
as a stage or different phase, of a business enterprise, 
it will be greatly difficult to divide the entire income 
into two parts. Ang if this division is carried out 
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there will arise serious difficulty. Supposing that 
Place A has a pasture, Place B, a milk manufactur· 
ing factory, Place C, a canning factory, and Place D, 
a selling shop, it may be contended that Place D only 
derives a profit. Thus no state where the pasture 
or the factory is located can get a part of the revenue, 
as there is no means of distribution. When Place A 
has the central supply bureau and Places B, C, and 
D are retail shops, Place A derives no profit and its 
state can derive no revenue. It is unjust to deny 
the state of Place A to the right to derive revenue, 
but there is no way of levying a tax if the principle 
under consideration should be adopted. If each Place 
were all retail shops, the income of each might be 
computed and a tax may be levied on each income. 
But when each of them is a part of an industrial 
unit, such computation wiII be very difficult because 
there is a business expense which is common to all. 
Thus the method under consideration has the serious 
diffuc1ty of impracticability. 
(ii). The execution of this method despite its 
impracticability will result in an injustice in the 
distribution of tax revenue. Taking advantage of this 
difficulty in distribution, business houses will shift 
their income to whereever the lightest tax is imposed, 
thereby aggravating the injustice involved. 
(iii). Because of this possibility some of the in· 
terested states will suffer losses in their revenue, and 
some of the states where branch establishments or 
factories are located may lose their entire revenue, 
as a consequence of what I have pointed out in (i). 
(B). Taking gross revenue as basis.-Instead of in-
come, gross revenue may be taken the basis of taxation. 
(a). Its merits. 
(i). Gross revenue or gross amount of sale is 
easier to reach than income and therefore it is more 
practicable. 
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(ii). Because of this easiness for reaching gross 
revenue or gross sale there is a corresponding cer· 
tainty of securing public revenue for a state. 
(iii). A rough estimate can be made of real in· 
come and distribute it among the interested states. 
(iv). Although the method may result (as will 
be explained later) in non·taxation in some states, 
where it is adopted there will be no double taxation. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). This method may be workable in case all 
the establishments of a business unit are all commer· 
cial ones, but it will not be so where some of them 
are commercial while others are industrial, because 
industrial establishments would have no gross revenue. 
Even where all establishments are commercial, those 
of them which are supply stores would derive no 
profit, and consequently the states where they are 
located will have no share of tax revenue. 
(ii). If those non·business establishments are tax-
ed, double taxation will ensue. 
(iii). If they are taxed injustice will ensue, but 
if they are not taxed, injustice also will follow. More· 
over, gross revenue cannot be regarded as. a good 
index of faculty in taxation; this is a fundamental 
objection to the method under consideration. -
(iv). If gross revenue is strictly construed and 
no tax is imposed by the states where non-business 
establishments are located, those states must lose a 
great portion of their public revenue. 
(C). Taking the amount of capital invested as basis. 
(a). Its merits.--' 
(i). This method is practicable in case of corpora-
tions, banks, and industries whose capital is visible 
to outsiders. 
(ii). So far as it concerns, it has the merit of 
certainty of public revenue. 
(iii). Double .taxation can be avoided. 
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(iv). Capital is a somewhat good index of in· 
come and a distribution of income based upon capital 
may be equitable. This system will not result in non· 
taxation in any of the states already referred to. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). This has the defect of difficulty in reaching 
the revenues of individual business firms. Where a 
business organisation is composed of such separate 
establishments as a pasture, factory, and selling de· 
partment, the difficulty of assessment will not be the 
same for each of them; the difficulty will increase in 
the given order. 
(ii). The difficulty in assessment gives rise to an 
unjust distribution of tax revenue among several 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, assessment based upon 
the amount of capital invested will not always cor· 
respond to the amount of income, and therein lies an 
injustice in taxation. 
(iii). Because of the foregoing defects some states 
will lose some portion of their public revenue. 
(D). Taking the rent of land and building as the 
basis. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). This is the most tangible method and assess· 
ment based upon this method will be most practicable. 
Moreover, it is better tJian any other methods as 
regards the division of tax revenue among the in· 
terested authorities. 
(ii). It is not only practicable but also enables 
the just division of tax revenue among the interested 
authorities, as every establishment must pay rent for 
the land and the building it occupies. Rent roughly 
expresses the extent of the protection and benefit each 
establishment receive!; from the state of situs. 
(iii). Each state will receive a proper share of 
revenue. 
(iv). Doullie taxation can be avoided. 
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(b). Its defects.-
(i). The method fails to take into consideration 
the personal element in business, and this results in 
an injustice in distribution. The personal element 
has close connection with the state of location and 
failure to consider it involves one serious fault. 
Especially where a single industry is composed of 
several establishments, such as a factory and a sell· 
ing depatment, the method will be found faulty, as 
the tax on a factory will be much larger than that 
on a selling department. Again between different 
selling departments, the amount of rent will not 
always correspond to that of their incomes. 
(ii). Some interested states are likely to suffer 
a loss in their public revenue. 
(E). Taking the number of employees as the basis. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). Reaching the taxable objects will be easy. 
(ii). As each business establishment has a certain 
number of employees, taxation according to number 
will be equitable. The number of employees can be 
taken as an indication of the extent of the protection 
and benefit given by a state. 
(iii). Each interested state will receive some share 
of revenue. 
(iv). Double taxation can be avoided. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). The greatest defect of this method is lack 
of justice. The number of employees cannot be re-
garded as a good index of the relative power between 
the whole industry and its branch establishments. 
Employees are of various ranks and of various powers 
so that they cannot be taken as equals. Of various 
establishments, a selling department will have a larger 
number of employees, than, say, a work shop. 
(ii). Some interested states may suffer a loss in 







(F). Taking the wages of employeeS as the basis. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). Reaching the taxable objects will be easy 
though in a lesser degree compared with the case of 
the number of employees. 
(ii). The rank and faculty as well as the impor' 
tance of employees are taken into consideration, and 
therefore it is juster than the method in which the num-
ber of employees is taken as the basis of taxation. 
(iii). Each interested state will receive a proper 
portion of the revenue. 
(iv). Double taxation can be avoided if all na-
tions should adopt this method. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). The method has one defect of difficulty in 
reaching the tax-objects. 
(ii). There is possibility of injustice because it 
fails to consider real elements in taxation. 
(iii). It may result in a financial embarrassment 
to some states. ' 
(G). Taking a combination of various bases as the 
basis.-Each of the foregoing bases has serious defects. 
For this reason combinations of several of them have 
been proposed, as the following will show. 
(A). Combination of income with some external basis. 
(i). Combination of income and capital invested. 
(a). Its merits.-
i. This method contains the fundamental justice 
of taking income as the basis of taxation; at the 
same time it takes into consideration the capital 
invested in order to avoid the difficulty of reaching. 
the taxable objects which is inherent in the method 
of taking income as the only basis. 
ii. Assessment and collection of tax will be 
easier. 
111. Each interested state will derive a proper 
amount of. revenue with certainty . 
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iv. Double taxation could be avoided. 
(b). Its defects. 
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i. The difficulty of reaching income and capital 
will persist to rerr.ain to some extent. It will be 
also difficult to divide income among the various 
establishments. 
ii. Since the method reaches capital (which is 
a purely real element in production) once more in 
addition to the income resulting from the operation 
of the personal as well as real elements, the share 
of the real elements of business will be much heavier 
than that of the personal elements. 
(ii). Combination of income and salaries. 
(a). Its merits.-
i. This method also contains the fundamental 
justice of taking income as the basis and is supple· 
mented by a consideration of the salaries which are 
easy to reach. 
ii. It has a merit of practicableness. 
iii. It ensures a proper revenue for every in· 
terested state. 
iv. Double taxation could be avoided if the 
system should be adopted by all nations. 
(b). Its defects.-
i. The difficulty of reaching income and of 
distributing tax revenue will persist to remain. 
ii. The personal elements of business are und u· 
ly emphasized. 
(B). Taking combinations of various external bases. 
(i). Combinations of definite external bases. 
(a). Combination of gross sale, rent of land and 
building, and the number of employees. 
i. Its merit.-Since the bases are comparative· 
ly easy to reach, the system has a merit of practi· 
cability. The defect of one basis can be remedied 
by the merit of other bases, and both the personal 
and real elements of business are evaluated pro· 
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perly. The method will give a proper revenue to 
each interested state and double taxation could be 
avoided if all nations should adopt the method. 
ii. Its defects.-As the method is composed of 
many bases, it has the defect of complication. The 
mere number of employees should be replaced by 
that of the amount of salaries paid to them. 
(b). Taking the rent of facilities and the number 
of employees, each as one half. 
i. Its merits.-The bases are easy to reach and 
it also has a merit of simplicity compared with 
the above' method. It considers both the personal 
and real elements of business equally, and is free 
from the defects of the system which we shall 
take up presently. The method also enables each 
interested state to derive a proper amount of revenue. 
Double taxation could be avoided if the method 
should be adopted by all states. 
ii. Its defects.-The respective value of each 
employee is totally neglected. The mere number 
of employees should be replaced by their salaries 
(including bonuses). It may be contended that both 
the rent and salaries will not correspond to the in· 
come of a given firm. This argument, however, 
will be met by the contention that, since income 
itself involves much difficulty although it approaches 
nearest to the ideal of faculty, such an external 
basis should be regarded as inevitable. The method 
is better than the income basis in international and 
local taxation, where not only one's faculty to pay 
but also the degree of benefits he has received 
from a state or a local district, are eqnally impor· 
tant. Employees also receive benefits from the 
state under whose jurisdiction they labour, and 
the various facilities of a given industry or busi-
ness also receive protection from the state of their 
location. CoHSideration of the rent of facilities 
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and employees' salaries is a proper basis of taxa-
tion. 
(ii). Combinations of different external bases for 
different businesses. 
(a). Its merits.-
i. This method is more practicable than the 
one just been considered, because in some business, 
other bases, such as capital invested or gross sale, 
may be more adapted than the rent bases. 
ii. It is a juster means of distribution. 
iii. Each interested authority will be enabled 
to get a proper share of tax. 
iv. Double taxation could be avoided when the 
method is adopted by all. 
(b). Its defects.-
i. Selection of bases for different businesses 
will be done arbitrarily and will result in an 
unequitable distribution. 
ii. It is too complicated to secure an interstate 
agreement for the pUrPOSe of avoiding international 
double taxation. 
Section II. Location of Persons and Securities 
in International Taxation. 
. I have already dwelt on some difficult cases in interna-
tional taxation and discussed their possible remedies. I shall 
further study another difficulty connected with the same 
question and which centers around persons and securities. 
The location of a person is usually the ·place of his resi-
dence, but when he has two places of residence, it is diffi-
cult to select one. As to securities, they can be taxed 
either by the authority of their location or by that of the 
residence of their owner. By the location of securities, may 
be meant either the place where they are actually kept, 
(i.e. a bank or trust company) or the place where the in-
terest or dividend thereon is paid, or the locations of the 
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state, local body and the corporation issuing the securities, 
or the location of the establishments of the firm or corpora· 
tion issuing the securities. Thus it is difficult to select one 
out of these numerous possible meanings. 
1. LOCATION OF PERSONS 
When a person has a single place of residence, there is 
scarcely no difficulty in international taxation on his pro· 
perty or income, but a serious complication wilI arise when 
he has two, suppOsing the principle of residence is to be 
adopted. The foIlowing are some of the plans proposed to 
. remedy the difficulty: 
(1). Solution through interstate agreements. 
(A). Method of taxing at one's principal place of 
residence.-When a person has two or more places of re- . 
sidence he is to be taxed at his principal place of resi-
dence. Interstate agreements should decide which is the 
principal place of residence, but if a person works in any 
of the interested states, he should be taxed in the country 
where he actuaIly works; if not, he should be taxed by 
the country of his political aIlegiance, provided the latter 
is one of the countries he resides in, because such place 
has deeper relations with him than any other places of 
residence. In case a person resides in neither of these 
two places, the place where he lives longest or where he 
pays the largest amount of rent should be chosen. If the 
amount of rent is taken instead of the period of residence, 
a person will have less occasion for deciding on the ques-
tion arbitrarily. When things cannot decide on the ques-
tion, he may be aIlowed to decide by himself. And, since 
a person will naturally select the place where taxes are 
lightest, a plan of equal distribution (which will be taken 
up lat~r) may be adopted. 
(a). Its merits.-
i. Double taxation will be avoided since all in-
terested states are to conclude an agreement. 
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ii. Considering the method from the technical 
standpoint, it may be said that a taxpayer's faculty 
to pay, progression, personal circumstances, considera· 
tion for debts, and exemption point, etc. will have a 
full chance for realisation under the proposed method. 
(b). Its defects.-
i. Taxing at only one place will give rise to a 
serious injustice. A person receives benefits from all 
the states in which he lives, and for this reason every 
one of the states has a right to tax him. The fact 
that he manifests faculty to pay in every one of the 
states may be taken as a sufficient reason for taxation. 
ii. Those states which do not tax him will lose 
a portion of their rightful revenue. The places where 
villas are located will suffer especially. 
iii. Consequently, it will be difficult to persuade 
all the interested states to conclude an agreement. 
iv. There is much technical difficulty in decid· 
ing on the principal place of residence. The place 
where one workS and his political allegiance are clear 
enough, but it will be mighty hard to decide on this 
qUestion according to the amount of rent paid or 
according to the length of his residence. There is 
an official standard for rent, but there is no way of 
fixing the length of one's residence, especially the 
members of one family may live separately in several 
places. It will be practically impossible to compare 
the lengths of residences in different places. Further· 
more, when one is to decide in what state he should 
pay tax, his whims and fancies may decide the whole 
question. As to selecting a residence at one's political 
allegiance, it must be noted that it is very often only 
a name. And if persons are to pay taxes at their 
political allegiances, they may choose the state where 
the lightest taxes are imposed as their domiciles. 






(B). Distributing taxes among the interested states. 
-There are various methods falliIlg under this principle, 
but each of them has the defect of offering an opportunity 
for tax evasion. However, as the method allows every 
interested state to derive some portion of the revenue, it 
is juster than the one we have just considered. When 
progression and exemption point are to be applied, they 
must be adopted in accordance with the total income or 
property of a taxPayer. 
(a). Method of taxing according to the lengths of 
the periods of residence. 
i. Its merits.-
a. It will prove the most just one if it can be 
adopted, as it is likely to result in an equitable 
distribution of revenue. Supposing a person has 
two residences and alternately live in them, it . will 
be just to tax" him by the authority of each resi-
dence according to the length of period he lives in 
each. 
b. Each interested state will derive a proper 
share of revenue. 
c. If an interstate agreement is concluded, 
double taxation woUId be avoided. 
ii. Its defects.-
a. The method involves a ~erious technical 
difficulty. When a person lives in two places al-
ternatively, the matter wilf be siInple, but when the 
master of a family lives in one place and other 
members in the other, serious difficulty will ensue, 
making the application of the method under con· 
sideration impossble. Even when the two places 
are used" alternatively, it will be greatly difficult to 
compute the length of the period of residence. In 
case the length of the period of residence in a 
. previous year is to be reported by a taxPayer, he 
would invariabIIy lengthen the period of residence 
in a state where comparatively lighter tax is iIn-
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posed, so as to make his tax burden as light as 
possible; and it is difficult to disprove such a re-
port. Furthennore, one may contend that it is 
unjust to base the distribution of one year's taxes 
upon a standard of a previous year; on the other 
hand, it is difficult to forecast the length of the 
period of residence of a particular year. Progression 
and exemption pOint should be based not upon 
different states' shares but upon the whole amount 
of the income or property; at any rate it will be 
difficult to take into considerations such things as 
personal circumstances or debts. 
b. Thus this method is liable to give rise to 
injustice in the distribution of tax revenue among 
competing authorities and in distributing tax burden 
among taxpayers .. 
(b). Method of taxing according to the amount of 
rents. 
i. Its merits.-
a. This method will enable the authority. of 
each interested state to derive a revenue which will 
be in accordance with the value of each residence 
-a share whose equitY will be established objec-
tively. 
b. Each interested state will derive a revenue 
which will be satisfactory to itself. 
c. The method will be highly practicable. Let 
each. person make a report of his rent certified by 
a proper authority. 
d. An interstate agreement ought to eliminate 
double taxation. 
ii. Its defects.-
a. The need of certifying a report involves 
difficulty but certification is necessary for a report 
of this kind. The method will have much difficulty 
in taking personal circumstances into consideration. 
b, The methc:d may give rise to injustice in 
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distribution. It does not take the length of the 
period of residence into consideration. Moreover, 
certification or revision of a report by an authority 
may be done arbitrarily, thereby giving birth to in· 
justice. These defects, however, are not so serious 
as to be unhearable. 
(c). Method of distributing tax revenue equally 
among the interested states. 
i. Its merits.-
a. The method is simple and practicable. 
b. It will enable each state to derive a pro· 
per amount of revenue. 
c. An interstate agreement adopting the method 
will eliminate double taxation. 
ii. Its defects.-
a. The method will not result in a just distribu· 
tion. All residences do not have equal values. 
Some are big, others are small; some are used for 
a long period, others, a short period. And, if the 
state of each is to get an equal share of revenue, 
an obvious injustice will follow. Its injustice will 
be clear when it is viewed from the theory of 
faculty. 
b. The state of main residence will lose a big 
portion of its rightful revenue. 
c. Personal circumstances will not be taken 
into consideration. 
(c). Method of giving a major portion to the state 
of main residence and the remainder to other states.-
The interested states are separated into two groups, the 
main state constituting the one and other states, the. 
other group, by applying the principles of work, political 
allegiance and rent, as given in the preceeding pages; 
and in case such separation is impossible, each state is 
regarded as equal of others and the revenue is divided 
equally among them all. After setting aside part of 
the revenue £(}r the main state, the remainder is divided 
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equally among the other states, although it is posible to 
divide it among those states in accordance to the 
amount of rent paid in each state; the last method is 
too complicated to be practicable. Taxation according 
to the amount of rent is also troublesome and the 
principle of work or political allegiance is preferable to 
it. When a person works in two places, one must be 
selected as the main state. In case this selection can· 
not be made, the principles of political allegiance and 
rent should be used as a supplementary standard. It 
is difficult to find a definite ratio of a share for the 
main state; however, when there are two residences, 
the state of the main residence should receive a two· 
third of the revenue; and if there are three or more 
residences, one· half should be reserved for the state of 
the main residence, although such divisions are more 
or less arbitrary. In applying progression, the principle 
just above mentioned under (Bl should be used. 
a. Its merits.-
i. This method is not very impractical. 
ii. The method makes distinction between the 
main and secondary states clear, thereby eliminat-
ing the injustice involved in the taxing of the main 
state alone as well as in the equal taxation among 
all the interested states. It is comparatively simple 
and conducive to equity. 
iii. Each interested state will derive a proper 
amount of revenue. 
iv. The method will eliminate double taxation. 
b. Its defects.-
i. The method involves some difficulty. In 
the first place, it is difficult frequently to select 
from several places one's place of work. Then it 
is also difficult to reach rents. The method fails to 
take personal circumstances into consideration. 
ii. Fixing the definite ratio of apportioning 









52 M. KAMBE 
ly involvEs a certain measure of arbitrariness, though 
such arbitrariness is often unavoidable in taxation. 
Domicile at one's political allegiance, which is one 
standard by which the main state is distinguished 
from secondary states, often exists in name only; 
and persons often select, such domiciles with an in· 
tention to evade taxes. For this reason it may 
best be eliminated as standard for taxation; and 
if this be done, the method would be less impractical. 
(2). Method adopted conveniently by a single country. 
-Each country adopts a method by itself. A country may 
tax a person having a residence in that country on the 
entire income or property without regard to other countries 
and the possibility of double taxation. The following are 
other methods faIling under this category: 
(A). Method of regarding house rent multiplied by 
a definite number as a minimum of income.-This method 
does not take into consideration other residences. Although 
it cannot be regarded as entirely just, at least has the 
merit of practicability inasmuch as no consideration of 
residences in other countries is required; and it must be 
noted that acquiring exact facts regarding residences in 
other states is very difficult. 
(B). Method of regarding a business shop as a resi· 
dence.-This method assumes that a person's' residence is 
located where he has his business shop. It is a convenient 
method for the authority which imposes the tax, but the 
assumption is unjustifiable. 
(C). Method of regarding a temporary residence as 
a permanent residence until it is proved otherwise.-The 
method is effective in preventing tax evasion but it in-
creases complication. Usually a certain period of residence 
is regarded as a condition for a permanent residence. 
! 
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2. TAXATION OF SECURITIES 
Tax on documentary securities may be levied either at the 
residence of the possessor (according to the personal prin-
ciple) or at the location of the securities (according to the 
real principle); and the latter method has divergent forms. 
(1). Method of taxing the owner of securities-personal 
principle. 
(A). Its merits.-
(a). This method will be regarded as just from 
the standpoint of either the idea that greater importance 
should be attached to person than property in taxation, 
or the view that personalty follows the owner-mobilia 
personam sequuntur. It also takes into consideration 
the benefit the owner receives from the state of his 
residence. 
(b). The method is practicable in the case of re-
gistered securities, and is juster than in the case of the 
real principle because it makes a personal lump-sum 
tax possible. 
(c). Adoption of this method by all nations will 
eliminate double taxation. 
(d). It will reduce the revenue of the state where 
the enterprise having relations with the securities is 
located, but the loss will be made up by the increase 
in the investment of foreign capital which will be one 
consequence from the exemption of the tax under con-
sideration. 
(E). Its defects.-
(a). The theory that personalty follows the owner 
does not apply in the case of securities; it may be true 
of such things as furnitures or implements. Securities 
are accompanied by the immovable enterprises or facili-
ties which represent them, and various kinds of pro-
tection are given to the latter. The owner of securities, 
therefore, must pay ;Jue consideration to the business 
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or facilities rather than to the securities themselves. 
Consideration of his residence to the exclusion of other 
factors will not be proper when viewed from justice in 
taxation. 
(b). States where the business or facilities are located 
will lose a portion of their public revenue, and their 
financial difficulty will be greater if the stocks held by 
foreigners are preference stocks. 
(C). Although double taxation could be avoided if 
the interested states should conclude an agreement, the 
state, where the business representing the securities is 
located, will not likely to refrain from taxing the busi-
ness, in which case double taxation will be inevitable. 
(d). It will not be practicable inasmuch as it must 
deal with a large number of unregistered certificates 
which will be difficult to reach. 
(e). It is not a desirable economic policy for the 
state of residence as it drives out the very people whom 
the state must welcome from the economical standpoint. 
Moreover, those people usually pay comparatively heavy 
taxes on consumption and, therefore, the imposition of 
no direct tax will be required for revenue purposes. 
(2). Methods based on real principle.-These methods 
are taxation solely on objects, and have the defect of not being 
equitable as in the case of the taxation based upon personal 
principle. Another defect is that it does not take into consid-
eration the position of the state to which the owner belongs. 
(A). Method of taxing securities where they are 
actually located. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). This method is definite and reaching the 
taxable objects will be comparatively easy. 
(ii). It may be regarded as just inasmuch as a 
certain amount of protection is given to the securities 
by the state of their location. 
(iii). Double taxation may be avoided through 
an interstate i;!greement. 
I 
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(b). Its defects.-
(i). The method cannot be justified from the 
standpoint of equity in taxation. True, protection is 
extended to securities by the state where they are 
located; but securities are merely certificates which 
can be re·issued whenever they are lost; and as pro-
perty, they are less important than the business facili· 
ties which are represented by them and which are 
the source of interest or dividend. Much greater 
protection is extended by the state where these facili-
ties are located than the state where the certificates 
are located; and it will be a great injustice to allow 
the latter state to receive the entire tax revenue 
while no portion is given to the former state. 
(ii). The state in which the resources are located 
will lose a great portion of its public revenue, and 
the same thing can be said of the state where the 
owner resides though to lesser degree. 
(iii). In actual practice it will be greatly difficult 
to conclude an interstate agreement regarding the 
adoption of this method, and some states will insist 
on taxing according to their own wills, thereby cau-
sing double taxation. 
(iv). The method will prove highly impracticable. 
The existence of securities is hard to prove while it 
is easy to hide them in order to evade taxation. 
Furthermore, their movability encourages tax evasion; 
this point alone is a sufficient reason for the rejection 
of the method. 
(B). Method of levying taxes where the earnings 
from securities are paid. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). No other method seems to be more practi-
cable and more certain than this method since the 
actual payment of earnings is made the basis of taxa-
tion. Moreover, the method can reach unregistered 





(ii). In one sense where an earning is actually 
paid is the resource; it is just and fair, therefore, 
that the authority which controls and protect this 
payment should have a right to impose taxes. 
(iii). An interstate agreement will eliminate double 
taxation. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). This method is not quite desirable from the 
viewpoint of justice in taxation. The place of pay-
ment is simply a place of convenience and can be 
changed at will; and for this reason it cannot be 
regarded as the source of income from securities. 
The real source of earnings from securities are busi-
ness establishments themselves which are represented 
by securities, and the location of these establishments 
is more important than that of securities. The authori-
ty which gives protection to the establishments should 
possess a greater power of taxation than the authority 
having jurisdiction over the place of payment of 
earnings from securities. 
(ii). The state where the business establishments 
are located will lose a portion of its rightful revenue. 
(iii). The method may cause tax evasion as the 
place where earnings are paid may be changed at 
will 
(C). Method of levying taxes where enterprises or 
organizations represented by securities are located. In 
case of government bonds, taxes are to be levied in the 
debtor state. In the case of commercial stocks and 
debentures, taxes are levied where the main office of the 
corporation issuing securities is located. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). This method is more effective in checking 
tax evasion than any other which has already been 
considered. The owner of securities, the place of 
their safe-keeping as well as the place of their pay-
ment are subIect to change, and this fact encourages 
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tax evasion. But there is absolutely no danger of 
evasion under the method now under consideration. 
As the method deals with the fundamental fact of 
securities there is no danger of evasion even of 
unregistered securities. This is the strongest merit 
of the method. 
(ii). Viewed from justice in taxation, the method 
can be said to be an equitable one inasmuch as it 
reaches the real sources of earnings. It can be said to be 
the most natural method of stoppage. And the autho· 
rity having jurisdiction over the location of enterprises 
or organizations are located has a greater right of taxa-
tion than any other interested authorities. 
(iii). The authority having the greater relation-
ship with the business enterprises which are repre-
sented by securities, will secure correspondingly greater 
portion of the revenue. 
(iv). An interstate agreement will eliminate dou-
ble taxation. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). There is no defect as to its practicability. 
(ii). However, there is a grave doubt as to its 
justice. Although the state, where the main office of 
an enterprise or organization is located, may be re-
garded as the real source of earnings, it is not just 
to disregard the places where the earning is paid or 
the securities are held; those places are entitled to 
some portions of the revenue. However, this defect 
is not very serious. The method does not allow the 
states where branch establishments or factories are 
located to levY a tax on securities. Here the method 
of division of revenue discussed in the foregoing 
chapter on taxation on international business, may 
be used- as a supplement 
(iii). The aforementioned defects will result in a 
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(iv). The method discourages the importation of 
capital into the country where the resources are 
located. 
(D). Method of taxing, in the case of stocks, not only 
at the place where the main office of the business repre· 
sented by the securities is located, but at the places of 
branch estabHshments as well, according to a definite 
standard of taxation, the division of the revenue being. 
based upon the methods we have already considered in 
connection with taxation on international business. 
(a). Its merits.-
(i). This method is juster than the preceding 
one when viewed from the standpoint of equality in 
the distribution of taxes, as it allows all the interested' 
authorities to secure a portion of the revenue. 
(ii). The method is a desirable one from the 
viewpoint of the public finances of the interested 
states. 
(iii). An interstate agreement regarding the adop-
tion of the method ought to eliminate double taxa-
tion. 
(b). Its defects.-
(i). Its greatest defect is impracticability. The 
division of taxes among all the branch establishments 
in addition to the main office is inevitablly too in-
tricate to be a praticable system. 
(ii). The method is not perfectly just inasmuch 
as it fails to take into consideration the place of the 
payment of earnings and the place where the taxable 
securities are held. 
(3). Method, embodying the personal as well as real 
principles.-This method takes the view that one half im-
portance of securities exists in person while. the other half, 
in tax-object, and the tax is levied at both the place of the 
owner and that of the location of the organizations or busi-
ness establishments which are represented by the securities. 
In the case of stocks, the tax is levied at the location of 
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the main affice as well as at those of branch establishments 
or factories. 
(A). Its merits.-
(a). The method is just because it embodies both the 
personal and real principle-person as well as things. 
It eliminates the defects of each principle. 
(b). In its technical aspect, progression can be. 
adopted in personal taxation, while taxation at the loca· 
tion of property can reach the tax'objects with certainty. 
(c). All interested authorities can secure some por· 
tion of the revenue. 
(d). An interstate agreement regading the method 
will eliminate double taxation. 
(Bl. Its defects.-
(a). Its greatest defect is the high intricacy which 
makes the method impracticable. 
(b). It is not quite just as it fails to consider the 
place where securities are held and the place where the 
actual payment of earnings is made. This defect, how· 
ever, is not serious enough to discredit the method all 
together. 
PART III 
DOUBLE TAXATION IN THE TRANSACTION 
AND CONSUMPTION TAXES 
Double taxation chiefly takes place in direct taxes such 
as taxes on income, products, and property. Domestic and 
international double taxation is usually discussed in reference 
to those taxes, and my previous discussion also concerned 
itself with them. However, the phenomenon of double taxa· 
tion is not limited to them alone: it is also seen in other 
taxes such as the transaction and consumption taxes. I 
shall now take up this phase of double taxation. 
----'-- ._------_._---_. 
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1. DOUBLE TAXATION IN TRANSACTION TAXES 
(1). Ordinary transaction taxes. 
(A). Double taxation viewed from the source of 
taxes.-
(a). Double taxation between one of transaction 
taxes and the principal direct taxes.-A transaction tax. 
is in the nature of a supplementary tax for the principal 
direct taxes (the income, products, and property taxes). 
This means that it is imposed upon the income or pro-
perty which has been taxed once, and in consequence 
a double taxation on the same source of tax. But this 
kind of double taxation is regarded as permissible under 
the present tax system, and for this reason does not 
constitute a serious problem. It is sufficient here to 
remember that there is such double taxation. 
(b). Double taxation between different transaction 
taxes.-Double taxation on the same source of tax often 
takes place between transaction taxes themselves. An 
example is to be. found in the imposition of the stamp 
duty and the register tax on the same object. Such 
double taxation seems inevitable because of the follow-
ing reasons: in the first place, each of these two taxes 
regards the object as a different tax·object; secondly, 
the taxes are intended as supplementary to each other; 
and lastly, modern states usually adopt a multiple tax 
system instead of a single tax system. A business 
transaction which merely represents the will of the 
transactors is vastly different from the same transaction 
plus government registration thereof in preparation 
against the possible claim of a third party, and the 
latter is regarded as representing a faculty higher than 
the former. This justifies each of these two taxes. 
When both are levied, there arises double taxation. 
(B). Double taxation viewed from tax·objects. 
(a). External double taxation.-One notable in-
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stance is to be found in the case of a stamp tax upon 
securities circulated internationally. This, however, is 
not regarded as serious because such a tax usually in· 
volves but a small amount of revenue. The adoption 
of an agreement among nations to levy a tax only in 
the state where the securities are issued will eliminate 
double taxation; such an agreement is indeed desir· 
able. 
(b). Internal double taxation.-
(i). The view that admits of double taxation.-
The objects of transaction taxes are value-objects as 
manifested in communication, and the taxes are levi-
ed upon them only at the time when the objects are 
taken in their relations with communication. Suppo-
sing there are three similar objects, the first of which 
does not become a matter of communication dUring 
a definite period of time, while the second becomes 
such a matter but once, and the third, twice-then 
no tax will be levied on the first, while the second 
will be taxed but once, and the third, twice. Thus, 
if the second is taken as a standard, the third is 
subject to double taxation. Although such a pheno· 
menon seems to be inevitable from the very nature 
of such a tax, it is undoubtedly an unjust system. 
A transaction tax is thus regarded as necessarily in-
volving the injustice of double taxation. 
(ii). The view that does not admit of double 
taxation.-It is possible to regard the object of a 
transaction tax as a matter of communication Or as 
an object manifested in communication. Since such 
a tax is levied on an object in reference to its faculty 
manifested at a particular point of ,communication, it 
may he argued that the system is not double taxa-
tion. The tax is levied not in terms of land and 
other objects manifested in communication but in 
terms of the time element-the time of transaction. 
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two different things in two diffrent times. Physically 
the object may be the same thing, but at least in the 
conception of taxation it can be regarded as different 
things, and a transaction tax may not be regarded as 
double taxation. 
(2). The inheritance tax in particular. 
(A). Causes for double taxation.-The first question 
is whether the personal or real principle should be adopt-
ed, and if the former principle is to be adopted the next 
question will be whether the legator or inheritor should 
be taxed. Supposing the legator or inheritor is to be 
taxed, there will arise the question whether he be taxed 
by the state of his political allegiance or the authority of 
his permanent residence or that of his temporary resi-
dence. In actual practice there arise many such ques-
tions, the solution of which is difficult indeed. Taxation 
on the immovables and their rights is usually based upon 
the real principle, but sometimes it is' based upon the 
personal principle and this fact also causes double taxa-
tion. Of the movables, tangible properties and those hav-
ing external bases can be taxed according to either the 
principle of location or that of residence, and this possi-
bility is also a potent source of double taxation. Of those 
having external bases, stocks and bonds may be taxed at 
one of the following places: the place where securities 
are held; the place of payment of earnings; the location 
of the capital of a state, or of the local government and 
of the main office of the organization or company; or the 
the location of the business establishments. Double taxa-
tion is liable to rise even among the authorities adopting 
the principle of location. It is impossible to tax intangible 
properties or rights at the place of their location; and 
they must be taxed at the residence of their owners, 
especially the legator. Double taxation is more frequent-
ly seen in the case of tangible movables which can be 
taxed according to either the personal or real 'principle, 
at the discretion of a state. An interstate agreement can 
---'''----------- --_ .. --_. __ ...... __ .... -. 
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eliminate this phenomenon, but it will be difficult to con-
clude such an agreement among different nations_ 
eBl- Principles of international taxation_ 
(a)_ The real principle. or the personal principle_ 
(i). The real principle. 
a. Its merits.-
i. Since the tax is levied at the location 
of objects, it is highly practicable. It is especial-
ly effective in reaching land, houses, business, 
registered securities and other principal forms 
of property. Of course there are things which 
may escape taxation even under this principle 
but they will also do so under the personal prin-
ciple. 
ii. Since protection is extended to all taxable 
objects at their location, it is just that they be 
taxed by the authority of their location, when 
they are transferred from one person to another. 
Of the various inheritance taxes, the estate duty 
must be taxed by the authority of the location of 
the estate, inasmuch as it is intended to make up 
the revenue loss made through the evasion of the 
direct tax by the decedent during his life time. 
iii. This principle is desirable for the public 
revenue of the state of location. 
iv. An interstate agreement ought to elimi-
nate double taxation. 
b. Its defects.-
i. Inheritance is not only a phenomenon of 
property but is also a matter of person and 
signifies a change in the status of one's owner-
ship. The fact of inheritance begins with the 
death of the legator whose property is secured 
by the inheritor without labour. Thus inheritance 
necessarily involves personal circumstances. The 
inheritance tax considered only from the stand-






tax considered only from the viewpoint of pro-
perty will be also unjust. 
ii. The public revenue of the country where 
the tax·subject resides will be reduced if the tax 
is to be wholly levied on the tax-object. 
iii. It is difficult to adopt progression as the 
taxation of the whole property of the legator or 
of the inheritor. Neither can debts be deducted 
properly. Moreover, taxes on the movables may 
easily be evaded. 
(ii). The personal principle. 
a. Its merits.-
i. Under the operation of this principle the 
adoption of progression in the taxation of the 
property left by the decedent or received by the 
inheritor will be possible. The deduction of debts 
will be also possible, and the movables can be 
reached. 
ii. The principle may be said to be fair from 
the standpoint of justice in taxation, because the 
inheritance tax is due to the death of the legator 
and is levied upon the unearned income of the 
inheritor. 
iii. The state to which the taxpayer belongs 
will get a share of the revenue. 
iv. An interstate agreement will eliminate 
double taxation. 
b. Its defects.-
i. There is a great danger of tax evasion 
which, however, can be remedied to some extent 
through international cooperation. 
ii. It is unjust to disregard the country to 
which the tax-objects belong. 
iii. The country where the tax-objects are 
located will lose a portion of its rightful revenue. 
(iii). Combination of both principles.-The re-
venue is di",ided equally between the country of the 
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taxpayer's residence and that of the location of the 
property which affects international relations. 
(a). As far as the tax'objects are concerned 
there will be but little tax evasion. There will be 
much international cooperation and the country of 
the residence of the tax'subject will receive a por-
tion of the revenue. The country of the tax-subject's 
residence may adopt a lump-sum progressive tax. 
(b). Both the country of residence and that of 
location can get a share of the revenue. This 
makes the method more equitable. 
(c). All interested authorities will receive a 
portion of the revenue. This will be impossible 
where any- one-sided method is adopted. 
(d). Double taxation will be eliminated. This 
principle is the best of all. 
(b). Two forms of personal principle: the inheritor 
principle or the legator principle. 
In most cases the inheritance tax is imposed on the 
legator principle instead of the inheritor principle, but the 
latter also has a strong theoretical reason in its favour so 
that the lawmaker will find it difficult which to adopt. 
(i). The legator principle. 
(a). Its merits.-
i. This system is less practicable than a real 
principle but better than the inheritor principle. It is 
the legator from whom the act of inheritance commences 
and he can be reached at his residence with more 
certainty than in the case of the inheritor This is 
further supported by the fact that usually part of the 
property inherited is located at the residence of the 
legator or decedent. 
ii. Viewing the matter from justice in taxation, it 
must be noted that the taxation of inheritance arises 
because of the commencement of inheritance; that it . 
often results from the death of those whose property is 
inherited; and that it i~ concerned with the settlement 
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of the estate of a decedent or legator. For this reason 
it seems just that the inheritance tax should be levied 
by the state to which the legator belongs. The fact 
that the estate duty is intended to make up the loss in 
the revenue made by the evasion of taxes on property 
by the legator in the past, addes to the weight of the 
foregoing argument. As to taxes on recipient, so long 
as they concern themselves with the settlement of the 
estate of a legator, they should be levied by the country 
to which he belongs. 
iii. The tax will benefit the public revenue of the 
state to which the legator belongs. 
iv. An interstate agreement will eliminate double 
taxation. 
(b). Its defects.-
i. In the case of the inheritance tax proper, name-
ly taxes on recipient, (which are imposed upon unearned 
income) it seems juster that the state of the inheritor 
instead of the legator should levy the tax. And, if 
the inheritance tax proper is levied by the state of the 
inheritor, the estate duty should also be levied by the 
same authority, as the latter is regarded as a supple-
ment to the former, beside its being intended to make 
up the past loss of revenue. 
ii. The state of the inheritor will lose a portion of 
its revenue. 
(ii). The inheritor principle. 
(a). Its merits.-
i. This principle may be said to be just as it is 
imposed upon the inheritor's special faculty based upon 
his unearned income. 
ii. The state of the inheritor will be enabled to . 
derive a revenue. 
iii. An international agreement will eliminate double 
taxation. 
(b). Its defects.-
i. It disregards the fact that inheritance owe its 
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orIgm to the decedent or legator and that the estate 
duty is intended to make up the loss of revenue 
caused by the tax evasion by the legator. Any system 
which does not allow the state of the legator to levy 
the inheritance tax must be unjust. 
ii. The state of the legator will lose a portion of 
its rightful revenue, 
iii. This principle is liable to cause much tax 
evasion. When the inheritance tax is imposed, not at 
the location of the property inherited, it will be difficult 
indeed to tax the inheritor, especially in view of the 
fact that the system disregards the cause of the com-
mencement of inheritance-the legator. 
(iii). Combination of the two systems.-Under this 
system both the state of the inheritor and that of the legator 
will be able to levy an inheritance tax. There are the 
following two forms of the system. 
(a). A system under which the estate duty is levied 
by the state of the legator while the tax on recipient, by 
the state of the inheritor.-This system eradicates the evil 
involved in either of the two systems already considered 
-the tax levied by either the state of inheritor or that 
of the legator. The division of revenue under this system 
is based upon the fact that the estate duty has close re-
lations with the state of the legator, and the tax on reci-
pient, with that of the inheritor. However, it is im-
possible to make such an absolute distinction between the 
two, as each of the two taxes involves the interests of the 
other. Moreover, there are states which do not adopt 
the two taxes together, having only the tax on recipient 
or the estate duty. Should those countries adopt this 
system, an unjust distribution of revenue would inevitabl-
ly follow. Some countries will also lose a portion of their 
rightful revenue. I have no idea to recommend this 
system to lawmakers. 
(b). The system of an equal division of revenue 
between the two states.-,,-This system will satisfy the 
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claims of both the state of the inheritor and that of the 
legator with regards to their shares of 'the revenue. It is 
also practicable and can be adopted by both states with 
good results. 
( c). The inheritance tax under personal principle (in-
heritor or legator) should be levied by the state of one's 
permanent residence, instead of his political allegiance or 
temporary residence. The reason for this is given in 
Chapter 1, Part 11, under the title of Discussion -over 
Principles of International Taxation. In modern times 
permanent residence has much closer relationship to a 
man's economic life than either his political allegiance or 
temporary residence_ Political allegiance is· reagrded com-
paratively unimportant to-day, while the relations between 
a man and his temporary residence are only ephemeraL 
Neither is it a sufficient basis for a tax which is levied 
upon a man only once in his lifetime. However, the 
ordinary transaction and consumption taxes are levied not 
unfrequently by the state of one's temporary residence. 
In view of this fact, it is noteworthy that the inheritance 
tax is not following the same line of thought. 
(d)_ The location of documentary securities under a 
real principle is another question that must be faced. 
However, this question has been discussed in the chapter 
on taxation of international business, specially in reference 
to documentary securities. The state where the main 
office of an enterprise or organisation is located should 
impose the tax. In the case of shares of stocks the tax 
should be levied where the business establishments are 
located. Although this is difficult to practice, it is not 
impossible of realisation through international cooperation.-
An inheritance tax upon securities should be divided be-
tween the residence of the tax-subject and location of the 
tax-object_ 
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2. DOUBLE TAXATION IN CON-
SUMPTION TAXES 
69 
(1). Double taxation viewed from the source of taxes. 
-Double taxation in the sense of taxing the same source 
of taxes twice over wiII be unavoidable in any consumption 
tax. In the first place, the consumption taxes are imposed 
on men's faculty as manifested in. their power of consump-
tion. Tbe income tax, the tax on products, and the pro-
perty tax are all levied on income, products which give 
birth to income, and property which is also a manifestation 
of income. Consumption is regarded as dependent upon 
income, and taxing consumption is the same as taxing in-
come. When, therefore, a consumption tax is levied, after 
the income, or the product tax, or the property tax has 
been levied, there will be double, or triple, or even quadruple 
taxation. This sort of double taxation, however, is not all 
together unpermissible in the modern fiscal system. 
(2). Double taxation viewed from taxable objects. 
-(A). Different cases and evils involved.-Double taxa-
tion which I shaIl now consider, namely taxing of the 
same tax-object twice over, is double taxation proper, and 
this phenomenon happens frequently and variously. Some 
believe that double taxation cannot take place in the con-
sumption taxes, but the matter is not so simple as people 
generaIly believe. True, double taxation would be im-
possible if taxes are levied at the time of consumption. 
But in actual practice they are levied at the time of pro-
duction_ For this reason, it is possible that a thing which 
was taxed once where it was produced can be taxed 
again in another country into which it is imported. It 
also happens that an import tax is levied on the material 
which after being manufactured is exported into another 
country where it is again taxed. Internally speaking, it 
is possible that a tax is levied upon the production of the 








within the same jurisdiction. In the case of the direct 
tax on use, a thing may be taxed twice, when transferred 
from one place to another, by the authorities of both 
places. When the consumption tax on some goods are 
not refunded upon their being exported, the export busi· 
ness of the country will be placed in a disadvantageous 
position. Such a system cannot said to be desirable from 
the economic policy of any nation. Refusal to return the 
payment of the import tax or delay in the payment of 
the tax will also prove detrimental to the commerce of 
the interested nations. Taxing both raw material anti 
manufactured goods will also be an economic burden 
upon the interested industries as well the consumers. 
Double taxation in the direct tax on use also will result 
in an over burden, and therefore must be avoided. 
(B). Their remedies. 
(a). The indircet consumption tax.-Double taxation 
in the indirect consumption tax can be remedied com-
paratively easily. Drawbacks or exemption of the tax 
(under definite conditions) will remove the difficulty. This 
remedy has been adopted by some nations from the view-
point of their economic policies, and of tax burdens. 
(i). Internal cases.-The following cases are found 
in Japan: 
a. The raw materials which are used in ma-
nufacturing the things on which are imposed the 
consumption tax, are either exempted or untaxed. 
Examples are found in the case of taxes on sake 
and other alcoholic beverages and also in that of 
the sugar consumption tax. 
b. Exemption is made in the case of the ma-
nufactured goods which are made of the material 
on which a similar consumption tax has already 
been levied. An example of this practice is found 
in the sugar consumption tax. 
c. No consumption tax is levied at the time 
of a secQnd business transaction, although it is 
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levied at the first time. An example is found in 
the case of the textile consumption tax. 
(ii). External cases.-Individual states adopt va· 
rious means separately in order to avoid international 
double taxation, instead of waiting to accomplish the 
same purpose through an interstate agreement, in· 
cidentally protecting their own interests thereby. 
a. The following means have been adopted by 
nations with regard to their internal taxes on con-
sumption: 
i. The goods or manufactured articles which 
are made with the purpose of exportation, are 
exempted from the consumption tax. An ex-
ample in Japan's fiscal system is found in the 
case of the tax on soft drinks, the sugar tax, the tax 
on playing card and the textile consumption tax. 
ii. Draw backs are made on the tax already 
paid at the time of exportation. The taxes on 
sake, beer and other alcoholic beverages, the 
sugar consumption tax, and the textile consump-
tion tax, are examples of this system. 
b. Tariff duties are exempted on the raw 
materials which are imported for the express pur-
pose of manufacturing. Tariff duties on such mao 
terials are also returned to the taxpayer. 
(b). The direct taxes on use.-Taxes on the things 
which are used in different places the periods of which 
can be ascertained, are levied in accordance with the 
length of the periods. If the entire amount of the tax 
upon the use of a thing is paid to place A, although it 
is used part of the time in place B, a part of the tax 
must be returned by the state of place A. In case it 
is impossible to ascertain the period (which will be 
the case where a thing is used in many different places 
within one year, for example), the only method will be 
to conclude some sort of an agreement for the appor· 
tioning of the tax (fQr example, equal distribution). 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary:-
(1). The word "double taxation" is not adequate to 
designate the real meaning it is intended to convey. The 
real meaning of the word is taxing the same taxable object 
twice over. There are various cases of double taxation: 
that of taxing different persons on the same thing, that of 
taxing the same person ; double taxation under the same 
authority, that under different authorities (either those of 
different ranks or competing authorities); double taxation 
through the same tax or that through different taxes. 
Some of these cases are justifiable while others are not so. 
Those cases which are unjustifiable as well as important 
are those between equal local authorities within a state and 
those between different states. There must be some means 
to readjust tax relations so as to eliminate double taxation 
in those cases. Double taxation in general has become 
more and more important due to various changes in modern 
times, and is regarded as a serious problem from the stand-
point of justice in taxation. 
(2). There are the following three principles of interna-
tional taxation: the personal principle, the real principle, 
and the combination of the two. The first and third princi-
ples have many sub·divisions. As to the combination of 
the first and second principles, the best method is to take 
into consideration both residence and the resource, and the 
equal division of the direct taxes between the state of re-
sidence and that of the location of the tax-object. An in-
terstate agreement regarding the adoption of this principle 
ought to eliminate double taxation, although the conclusion 
of such an agreement will be a difficult task. Taxing in-
ternational business is also difficult. To avoid double taxa-
tion in this connection it is necessary to conclude an agree-
ment among the nations concerning the adoption of a principle 
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among the interested parties. The best conceivable method 
will be to establish a definite scale of the division of tax 
between the state where the main office of a given business 
establishment is located and the state where the branch 
establishments of the business enterprise are located, and 
to distribute the tax among the latter states in proportion 
to the rental value of each establishment and the salaries 
or number of the employees. This method, of course, has 
some shortcomings, but it is better than any other. Taxa· 
tion of persons having many residences in different countries 
and that of documentary securities present a baffling situa· 
tion. However, an interstate agreement even in these case 
will eliminate double taxation to some extent. In the case 
of a person having many residences in different countries, 
his main residence should be first decided upon by taking 
into consideration the place of his work and the amount of 
rental value at each residence. Then after setting aside a 
certain portion of revenue for the state of his main resi· 
dence, the remainder should be divided equally among the 
rest of the states. As to documentary securities, the most 
practicable method is to divide the tax revenue equally be-
tween the state of their owner's residence, on one hand, 
and those where the organization or the business establish-
ments represented by the securities are located, on the 
other. 
(3). Double taxation in the transaction and consump-
tion taxes often escapes the attention of people but it is 
also an issue which must be scrutinized. However, double 
taxation in the ordinary trasaction taxes in a sense is not 
double taxation in the true sense, and therefore there is no 
need of an attempt to eliminate it. As to the indirect con-
sumption taxes, nations ar~ attempting to avoid it both in 
internal and external taxation, chiefly because of the necessity 
of their economic policies. But the inheritance tax has 
proved a serious question for all nations. The fact that the 
nations adopt various principle of taxation on inheritance 
has given rise to double_taxation in this tax. I am of the 
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opinion that the combination of the personal and real princi-
ples is the best conceivable method; that, where the 
personal principle is adopted, the principle of inheritor and 
that of legator should be adopted as supplement; that the 
principle of residence is the best basis of taxation; and that, 
in case of documentary securities, the tax should be levied 
where the main office of the enterprise or the headquarters 
of the organization is located. The stamp duty on docu-
mentary securities which are circulated internationally and 
on the direct consumption tax on the use of the objects 
which are used internationally, also give rise to double taxa-
tion. In the former case the duty should be levied where 
the securities are issued; in the latter case, the tax should 
be apportioned among the different places in accordance 
with the periods of use; if the latter can not be used, an 
equal distribution among the places should be adopted. 
There seems to be no other method which is more effective. 
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